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CONSTRUCTING THE YELLOW BRICK
ROAD: PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGAINST THE
LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY.
Cyrus Mostaghim*

ABSTRACT
The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Questioning
(“LGBTQ+”) community lacks explicit statutory protections from
discrimination in financial services. After the Supreme Court held in Bostock
that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity
was illegal, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued an
informal interpretive rule for the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and
Regulation B that made discrimination in the access to credit based on sexual
orientation or gender identity illegal.
However, this article argues that an informal interpretive rule is easily
rescinded and does not provide sufficient protection. Thus, alternative action is
needed to create ore durable protection from discrimination against the
LGBTQ+ community in the provision of financial services. Additionally, the
increased use of AI in the financial industry magnifies the need for more durable
protections to prevent the accidental usage of biased data to build and train the
industry’s AI algorithms.
This article examines the potential and limitations of existing consumer
protection laws, possible pathways to create more permanent protection, and
potential impacts from regulatory changes. This article also considers
additional regulatory changes to other consumer protection statutes that may be
needed to enable the identification of discriminatory acts. These changes may
require financial institutions to collect sexual orientation and gender identity
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University Washington College of Law. I would like to thank all of my friends, family, and work
colleages for their support and encouragement over the last two years as I worked on this article, in
addition to the pursuit of my legal degree. Special thanks to Professor Hilary Allen for her time,
mentorship, and encouragement of my research. Finally, the Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial
Law Review for their effort and help throughout the publication process.
DISCLAIMER: While the author is an employee of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”), this article’s contents reflect the author’s thoughts as a private citizen, not as an employee
or representative of the CFPB. The author wrote this article using only publicly available information
and without the misuse of any CFPB resources. The article’s contents should not be interpreted to be
associated with the CFPB in any manner or construed in any way to be a representation or statement
from the CFPB.
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data – something that must be done with sensitivity because of a data privacy
issue unique to the community: accidental outing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Picture it, going to the bank to apply for a mortgage loan and the employee
refusing to give you an application because of whom you love or how you are
dressed.
In 1998, L. 1 Rosa, a transgender woman, encountered discrimination when
she tried to obtain a mortgage application. 2 At the bank, an employee refused to
provide an application because the clothing Rosa wore did not conform with the
birth gender that was listed on her identification. 3 Or imagine how Adola DeWolf
and Laura Watts, a lesbian couple, felt as they faced the threat of foreclosure when
they tried to update mortgage documents to recognize their partnership because
the bank did not recognize domestic partnerships. 4
Homeownership is an integral part of the “Great American Dream.”
However, for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ+)
community (or “the community”), achieving homeownership is much more
difficult than for their heterosexual peers, in part because of the hurdles they face
when accessing financial services. 5 While there are few federal cases related to
financial discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community, discrimination against
the community persists and creates hurdles when accessing the financial services
needed to buy a home. 6 Discrimination in financial services occurs when a
negative action, such as denial of credit or a higher interest rate, is based on a
protected status, like race, gender, or receiving federal assistance, or when an
action has a disparate impact on a protected class. 7 Several recent studies have
asserted the existence of discrimination against the community via analysis of
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data of same-sex applicants as a proxy

1. Author’s note: The legal first name in the court records for Ms. Rosa is Lucas. However,
out of respect and uncertainty based on records that are more than twenty years old, I am only using
the first initial in this article’s text to avoid potentially using Ms. Rosa’s deadname (name given at
birth that typically only aligns with the individual’s birth gender).
2. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 2000).
3. Id.
4. DeWolf & Watts v. Countrywide, LAMBDA LEGAL, [hereinafter DeWolf & Watts Summary],
https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/dewolf-and-watts-v-countrywide (last visited Apr. 17, 2021)
(summarizing claim from unreported case that resulted in settlement).
5. See ADAM P. ROMERO ET AL., LGBT PEOPLE AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY,
DISCRIMINATION, AND HOMELESSNESS 3, 10-12, 14 (UCLA Sch. L. Williams Inst. Ed., 2020), https://
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Housing-Apr-2020.pdf (covering various
statistics of LGBTQ+ housing affordability, homeownership rates, and homelessness rates);
Homeownership: The American Dream, HUD USER: OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND
RESEARCH (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-frm-asst-sec081318.html.
6. See id.
7. See 12 U.S.C § 2901 (requiring financial institutions to “serve the convenience and needs
of the communities in which they are chartered to do business”); Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (defining credit decision discrimination); e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of African-American Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (claiming declined business
relationship based on plaintiff’s race was discrimination).

66

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 11:1

for LGBTQ+ applicants. 8 One study found that for non-objective reasons, samesex applicants were charged between 0.02%-0.20% more interest than similarly
situated opposite-sex applicants. 9 While there are already some legal protections
against this type of discrimination, this article argues that they are insufficient and
that more concrete protections are needed.
Many of the fair lending laws and regulations, and federal anti-discrimination
laws and regulations in general, define protected classes using the same categories
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as interpreted by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)). 10 The EEOC is the federal
agency responsible for enforcing federal laws that deal with employment
discrimination, including Title VII. 11 Before the decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County, 12 agencies had the choice whether or not to defer to the EEOC’s
interpretation that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity
was a type of sex discrimination. 13 While the Bostock decision codified the
EEOC’s interpretation into law, the interpretation only applies to Title VII, and
8. See e.g., J. Shahar Dillbary & Griffin Edwards, An Empirical Analysis of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019) (using HMDA data to identify trends in
discriminatory lending against LGBTQ+ community); Hua Sun & Lei Gao, Lending Practices to
Same-Sex Borrowers, 116 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 9293, 9293 (2019) (discussing trends in
discrimination against same-sex applicants with spillover effects to opposite-sex applicants, an
indicator of reverse redlining), https://www.pnas.org/content/116/19/9293; Jason Richardson &
Karen Kali, Same-Sex Couples and Mortgage Lending, NAT’L CMTY REINV. COAL (2020),
https://ncrc.org/same-sex-couples-and-mortgage-lending/ (last accessed Sept. 19, 2020) (finding
indicators of discrimination against same-sex couples); Anneliese Lederer & Jake Lilien, Lending
Discrimination Faced by Same-Sex Couples in the Mortgage Arena, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT
COAL. (2020), https://ncrc.org/lending-discrimination-faced-by-same-sex-couples-in-the-mortgagearena/ (discussing findings from the NCRC report by Richardson and Kali).
9. Sun & Gao, supra note 8.
10. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin); see Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691
(prohibiting discrimination in providing credit based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex or
marital status, or age); Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (prohibiting discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, or handicap status for certain
housing-based actions).
11. EEOC, Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last visited Apr. 29, 2021).
12. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
13. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Sex-Based Discrimination, EEOC, [hereinafter EEOC
Discrimination Guidance], https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm (last visited Nov. 7, 2019)
(stating sexual orientation and gender identity are sex discrimination under Title VII); Memorandum
from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., DOJ, to U.S. Attorneys and Heads of Department Components (Dec.
15, 2014) [hereinafter Holder Memo], https://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download (stating DOJ
will interpret transgender employment discrimination as sex discrimination under Title VII); Letter
from Richard Cordray, Director, CFPB, to Michael Adams, CEO, Services & Advocacy for GLBT
Elders (SAGE) (Aug. 30, 2016) [hereinafter CFPB SAGE Letter], https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2016/09/SAGE-Letter.pdf (stating CFPB’s interprets ECOA covers sexual
orientation and gender identity as sex discrimination and citing EEOC’s Title VII interpretation);
Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., DOJ, to U.S. Attorneys and Heads of Department
Components (Oct. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Memo], https://assets.documentcloud.org
/documents/4067383/Attachment-2.pdf (reversing Holder’s interpretation for DOJ).
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federal financial regulators can still choose whether or not to follow the EEOC in
recognizing discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 14
However, Bostock can and has been used as justification to adopt a similar
interpretation in other areas of law that deal with sex-based discrimination. 15
On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order (EO) 13,988
that established an overarching position on policy to combat any discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 16 The order directs all federal
agencies to review all “existing orders, regulations, guidance documents, policies,
programs or other agency actions that” are related to sex-based discrimination
and take any necessary action to prevent discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity. 17 In March of 2021, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) released an informal interpretive rule regarding the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B that addressed
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 18 The interpretive
rule states that in the eyes of CFPB, discrimination based on sexual orientation or
gender identity is a form of sex-based discrimination and is illegal under ECOA
and Regulation B. 19
While EO 13,988 and CFPB’s interpretive rule are welcome progress, there
are serious weaknesses with the creation of protections in this manner. EOs are
easily and commonly revoked after a change in party for a presidential

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The future of LGBTQ Civil Rights, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtq-rights/reports/2020/08/26/489772/beyondbostock-future-lgbtq-civil-rights/ (postulating the application and impact of Bostock in employment,
education, health care, and housing); Katie Keith, Another Court Vacates LGBTQ-Specific Rollbacks
from New 1557 Rule, HEALTH AFFS. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377
/hblog20200904.528322/full/ (discussing impact of Bostock on HHS rule to roll back healthcare
protections for the LGBTQ+ community); Cyrus Mostaghim, Coming Out of the Title VII Closet:
Bostock’s Potential Ripple Effects on Financial Regulation, AM. U. BUS. L. REV.: THE BLR BUZZ
BLOG (Sept. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Mostaghim, Bostock’s Ripple Effects], http://www.aublr.org/2020
/09/coming-out-of-the-title-vii-closet-bostocks-potential-ripple-effects-on-financial-regulation/
(serving as author’s initial analysis of CFPB’s RFI on potentially using the holding from the Bostock
case to update ECOA to cover sexual orientation and gender identity and providing additional
background information).
16. Exec. Order No. 13,988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,023 (Jan. 20, 2021) [hereinafter EO 13,988].
17. Id. at 7023-24.
18. Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B); Discrimination on the Bases of Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity, 86 Fed. Reg. 14363 (Mar. 16, 2021) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002); CFPB Clarifies That
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is Illegal, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU (Mar. 09, 2020) [hereinafter CFPB ECOA Announcement], https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-clarifies-discrimination-by-lenders-on-basis-of-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-isillegal/.
19. Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B); Discrimination on the Bases of Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, 86 Fed. Reg. 14363 (Mar. 16, 2021) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1002); CFPB ECOA Announcement, supra note 18.
14.
15.
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administration. 20 With regard to CFPB’s informal interpretive rule, these kinds of
rules are easily rescinded and face additional hurdles when used for the basis of
an enforcement action. 21 Thus, further action is needed via regulatory, legislative,
or judicial action (or a combination of the three) to create concrete protection for
the LGBTQ+ community. 22 Such action must be particularly sensitive to the
unique privacy concerns that members of the LGBTQ+ community may have
with regard to accidental “outing,” which complicates data collection for
regulatory oversight. 23 Finally, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) machine
learning algorithms (specifically neural nets) and the fintech industry’s rapid
growth makes it imperative that action is taken as soon as possible. Every day
that passes allows these AIs to learn from and use potentially discriminatory data,
thereby building discrimination into the foundation of AIs and our finance
industry. 24
This article demonstrates the need for a more concrete and permanent legal
response to financial discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community as follows:
Part II provides some background on the history of discrimination and the legal
responses to it, while Part III discusses the various consumer finance statutes and
the roles that they could play in preventing financial discrimination against the
LGBTQ+ community. Part IV discusses the possible paths to creating more
concrete legal protection, and Part V discusses some of the potential impacts if
regulatory changes are pursued. Part VI will discuss the importance of preventing
discrimination from being built into the financial system via AI algorithms trained
with discriminatory data. Finally, Part VII will conclude.
II. THE NEED FOR ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR THE LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY
A. General History of Combatting Discrimination
The Supreme Court has identified certain minority groups that require
heightened scrutiny to protect them. 25 The process for identifying a “quasisuspect class” began with the definition in footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Company. 26 In the footnote, the Supreme Court stated that it
would take a closer look at cases that involved laws that affected “discrete and
insular minorities,” also referred to as quasi-suspect classes in the Court’s case
20. What is an Executive Order?, ABA: TEACHING LEGAL DOCS (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/what-is-anexecutive-order-/.
21. See infra Part IV Section b.
22. See infra Part IV Section b.
23. See infra Parts V Section c, VI.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (discussing discrete
and insular minorities).
26. See id.
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history. 27 In subsequent cases, the Court articulated the factors used to determine
if a group could qualify as a quasi-suspect class. 28 The case of City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 29 expressed these factors (the “Cleburne factors”)
most clearly: (1) the history of discrimination to see how deep-seated it was and
how long it lasted, (2) the group’s access to political power and ability to affect
change to it, and (3) whether the group is a minority with immutable
characteristics and keeps to itself. 30
In addition to establishing when a group is a quasi-suspect class, the Supreme
Court precedent has also determined the levels of scrutiny that all courts must use
to review challenges to laws that dictate the treatment of a quasi-suspect class. 31
There are three levels of scrutiny, rational, intermediate, and strict. 32 Rational
basis is the default level of scrutiny used for non-quasi-suspect classes, and “a
law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” 33
The burden of proof for rational basis falls with the challenger. 34 For
“intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if it is substantially related to an important
government purpose… [and] the government has the burden of proof.” 35 The
reason must have a “substantial relationship” to the desired outcome. 36 For strict
scrutiny, the government has the burden of proof and must convince the court that
a compelling purpose for the law exists, the law is narrowly tailored to achieve
the purpose, and a less discriminatory alternative does not exist. 37

27. Id.
28. See e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985)
(discussing Fifth Circuit’s analysis to determine intellectual disability was a quasi-suspect classes).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 438.
31. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725-948 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds.,
5th ed. 2017) (providing information on levels of scrutiny, how they are used, the level applied to
recognized quasi-suspect classes, and abridged versions of cases involving quasi-suspect classes).
32. Id. at 728.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 727-28.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.at 727.
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African Americans were the first group recognized as a quasi-suspect class. 38
The major milestones were the holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 39 that
segregation in education based on race was unconstitutional, the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, and the holding in Loving v. Virginia, 40 that marriage
restriction based on race was unconstitutional. 41 Quasi-suspect status was
eventually expanded to include all racial minorities. 42
Women have also suffered discrimination: the original Constitution’s text did
not recognize women’s rights and women had no right to vote until the Nineteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1920. 43 Making progress on women’s rights took
time and often required demonstrating that discrimination based on sex also
harmed men, like in Moritz v. Commissioner, 44 where the court found that the
IRS had discriminated against a man by disallowing a tax deduction that it would
have allowed for a woman. 45 In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 the court
found that discrimination based on sex stereotypes was a form of sex
discrimination. 47
Although the LGBTQ+ community has faced some form of persecution since
before the founding of this country, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the civil

38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing representation based on the number of free
persons and the three fifths rule, while excluding Native Americans); id. amends. XIII-XV (abolishing
slavery, creating equal representation and protection, and prohibiting discrimination based on race);
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that race-based restrictions
on marriage are unconstitutional); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96
(1954) (finding “separate but equal” unconstitutional for public education), enforced, Brown v. Bd.
of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (finding compliance with court’s 1954 decision
required public schools to desegregate); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (finding
separate but equal segregation based on race constitutional), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); infra footnotes 43-47 and associated text.
39. 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954), enforced, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
41. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957); Loving, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967); Brown, 349 U.S. 294, 294 (1955).
42. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957) (creating
commission to study denial of voting rights based on race and other classifications); see Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny because the order targeted people of
Japanese descent), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see generally U.S. CONST. (not mentioning women).
44. 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972).
45. Id. at 470.
46. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
47. Id. at 251; see also Hearing on Financial Services and the LGBTQ+ Community: A
Review of Discrimination in Lending and Housing Before the H. Comm on Fin. Serv., 116th Cong.
10-15 (2019) (statement of Harper Jean Tobin, Director of Policy, National Center for Transgender
Equality) [hereinafter Tobin] (discussing federal case law on sex-based stereotypes and HUD’s
acknowledgement of applicability to the Fair Housing Act and associated administrative rules).
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rights of the LGBTQ+ community has been relatively rapid when compared with
its progress on the rights of women and racial minorities. 48
B. The LGBTQ+ Community Lacks General
Concrete Discrimination Protection
This timeline started with the initial losses in Baker v. Nelson, 49 the first case
that argued the constitutionality of gay marriage in 1972, and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 50 a 1986 case where the Court held that LGBTQ+ individuals did not
have a right to sexual privacy. 51 However, ten years after Bowers, the tides began
to shift in favor of the community in Romer v. Evans, 52 where the Court found
that a state constitutional amendment barring and undoing local LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws was unconstitutional. 53 In the 2003 decision Lawrence v.
Texas, 54 the Court found that the community had a right to sexual privacy. 55 Over
the next seventeen years, the community gained the right to marry via Obergefell
v. Hodges, 56 and protection from discrimination in employment via Bostock. 57
Outside the contours of these specific court decisions, though, the LGBTQ+
community’s legal protections exist in a gray area. 58 Sexual orientation and

48. See GSAFE, A Timeline of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender History in the United
States, [hereinafter GSAFE LGBTQ+ Timeline] https://www.gsafewi.org/wp-content/uploads/USLGBT-Timeline-UPDATED.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2021) (providing timeline of LGBTQ+ legal
issues in United States); Milestones in the American Gay Rights Movement, PBS, [hereinafter PBS
LGBTQ+ Timeline] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/stonewall-milestonesamerican-gay-rights-movement/ (last visited July, 17 2021) (describing important events and figures
in gay rights timeline); LGBTQ Rights Timeline in American History, FAIR ED. ACT
IMPLEMENTATION COAL., [hereinafter Fair Educ. LGBTQ+ Timeline] https://www.lgbtqhistory.org
/lgbt-rights-timeline-in-american-history/ (last visited July 17, 2021) (providing timeline of gay rights
in U.S. history and mentioning important figures). See also sources cited supra note 38; Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (establishing LGBTQ+ community’s marriage rights); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (finding no sexual privacy right for LGBTQ+ community),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972)
(dismissing appeal for want of federal question regarding right to gay marriage), overruled by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
49. 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
50. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
51. Baker, 409 U.S.; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (1986).
52. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
54. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
55. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
56. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
57. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020); Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644, 681
(2015).
58. See generally Tobin supra note 47, at 10-15 (discussing history of HUD’s Equal Access
Rule and Secretary Carson’s actions to undo previous LGBTQ+ related protections). See cases cited
supra note 48; United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774-75 (2013) (finding Defense of Marriage
Act’s restrictions on LGBTQ+ community unconstitutional without stating level of scrutiny used);
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gender identity are not explicitly listed as a protected status in the language of
any federal statute, and the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated the level of
scrutiny that should be applied to assess laws that discriminate against the
community. 59
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock, sexual orientation and
gender identity had been somewhat protected in employment contexts. 60 The
EEOC had interpreted Title VII such that employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity was a form of sex discrimination. 61 This
interpretation gave sexual orientation and gender identity protections under the
“sex stereotypes” definition from the Supreme Court’s decision in Price
Waterhouse. 62 Under the EEOC’s interpretation, discrimination against an
LGBTQ+ individual because of the stereotype that men should be married to
women, and vice versa, is discrimination based on sex. 63 However, while the
Bostock decision confirmed the EEOC’s interpretation and gave it the full force
of the law, the protection only applies to employment discrimination under Title
VII. 64 Other federal regulators can choose to follow or ignore the EEOC’s
interpretation. 65 Thus, the LGBTQ+ community faces uncertainty regarding their
legal protections outside of the employment context. 66
C. The LGBTQ+ Community’s Current Protections for
Access to Financial Services.
A 2020 study by the UCLA School of Law’s Williams Institute revealed that
in the U.S., 21.6% of LGBTQ+ adults live in poverty as opposed to 15.7% of
their cis-gendered heterosexual adult counterparts. 67 The same study found that
Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (finding unconstitutional state constitution amendment barring
and undoing local LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws using rational basis without stating use).
59. See cases cited supra note 48. See generally Home Mortgage and Disclosure Act (HMDA)
of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2801; Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 12 U.S.C § 2901; Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
60. See Tobin, supra note 47 at 8; EEOC Discrimination Guidance, supra note 13.
61. See Tobin, supra note 47 at 8 (EEOC “clarifying that claims of discrimination based on
transgender status, also referred to as claims of discrimination based on gender identity, are cognizable
under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition.”); EEOC Discrimination Guidance, supra note 13.
62. 490 U.S., 228, 251 (1989) (finding discrimination based on sex stereotypes is sex
discrimination).
63. EEOC Discrimination Guidance, supra note 13
64. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
65. See Tobin, supra note 47 at 14-15 (discussing HUD’s adoption and subsequent attempt to
reverse the Equal Access Rule “designed to protect LGBTQ+ people experiencing homelessness.”).
See also Holder Memo, supra note 13; CFPB SAGE Letter, supra note 13; EEOC Discrimination
Guidance, supra note 13 (stating Title VII only addresses discrimination in employment practices);
Sessions Memo, supra note 13.
66. See generally Tobin, supra note 47 at 14-15; EEOC Discrimination Guidance, supra note
13; CFPB SAGE Letter, supra note 13.
67. See ROMERO ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 (covering various statistics of LGBTQ+ housing
affordability, homeownership rates, and homelessness rates).
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49.8% of LGBTQ+ adults own a home compared to 70.1% of non-LGBTQ+
adults, between 20-45% of homeless youth are LGBTQ+, and LGBTQ+ adults
“aged 18-25, . . . have a 2.2 times greater risk of homelessness than nonLGBT[Q+] people.” 68 These statistics run counter to the stereotype that LGBTQ+
Americans are part of a wealthy demographic, commonly referred to as
Single/Dual Income No Kids. 69 For the more vulnerable members of the
LGBTQ+ community, access to financial services can be critical in obtaining
housing. 70
There is a long history of discrimination in the provision of financial services
in the U.S., particularly discrimination against racial minorities. 71 At one point,
the solution was thought to be community banks catering to one or more minority
groups. 72 One takeaway from the African American community bank history is
that a community bank avoids discrimination and better facilitates the generation
of community wealth and success to support the existence of successful
individuals in the community. 73 Thus, some might recommend a similar
community banking solution for the LGBTQ+ community (something a few
groups have pursued). 74 Of course, the parallels between these communities only
go so far. Unlike racial minorities, much of the LGBTQ+ community has a chance
of avoiding detection and discrimination by staying in the closet while trying to
access financial services. 75 Strategies include not disclosing their sexual
orientation, applying as individuals instead of as a couple, and modifying their
appearance to conform with traditional gender stereotypes. 76 However, these

68. Id. at 3, 11-12.
69. Nathan McDermott, The Myth of Gay Affluence, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/the-myth-of-gay-affluence/284570/;
Julia
Kagan, Dual Income No Kids, INVESTOPEDIA (June 23, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms
/d/dinks.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2021); see ROMERO ET AL., supra note 67. See generally LGBTQ+
REAL EST. ALL, THE INAUGURAL HOUSING POLICY SYMPOSIUM REPORT FROM THE LGBTQ+ REAL
ESTATE ALLIANCE 22, 27 (2021) [hereinafter LGBTQ+ HOUSING REPORT], https://
realestatealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/alliance_v2-1.pdf (discussing LGBTQ+ housing
statistics).
70. See LGBTQ+ HOUSING REPORT, supra note 69, at 27 (discussing transgender housing
discrimination).
71. MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY 1, 5, 12 (2017) (discussing discrimination
against African Americans and other racial minorities in banking and access to credit).
72. See id. at 5 (analyzing difference in success of community banks for different minority
groups). See also id. at 46 (discussing how Jim Crow necessitated creation of African American
banks).
73. See id. at 42 (stating that reason for creation of some African American community
affiliated banks was to serve the community’s needs so loan decisions were often based on community
impact instead of traditional underwriting principles).
74. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
75. See Jack Drescher, The Closet: Psychological Issues of Being In and Coming Out,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Oct. 1, 2004), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/closet-psychologicalissues-being-and-coming-out (discussing how LGBTQ+ individuals stay in the closet).
76. See id.; LGBTQ+ HOUSING REPORT, supra note 69, at 23 (surveying LGBTQ+ individuals
with 13.8% admitting to signing forms “that did not adequately represent their life experience”).
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approaches are not always desirable or viable, especially for the transgender
community, so there may be a place for community banking as a solution to some
of these more unique challenges.
In 2019, the state of Michigan approved the charter for Superbia Credit
Union; the first LGBTQ+-focused national financial institution. 77 Michael Myers,
Superbia’s founder, was inspired to counteract certain issues that plagued
members of the LGBTQ+ community. 78 He cited issues including denying phone
services to a transgender account holder for not sounding like the gender on file
and denying mortgage services to a qualified same-sex couple shortly after gay
marriage was legalized in 2015. 79 However, Superbia is not the first or only
LGBTQ+ community-based financial institution. 80
The first LGBTQ+ community-based financial institution appears to be the
Dallas Gay Alliance Credit Union (DGACU), a state-chartered institution created
in 1988. 81 The DGACU had a short lifespan of less than ten years before it was
77. See Ruth Umoh, America’s First LGBT-Focused Credit Union to Launch in 2020, FORBES
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ruthumoh/2019/09/16/americas-first-lgbt-focusedcredit-union-to-launch-in-2020/#7fa48b315d17.
78. Karma Allen, Meet the Man Hoping to Battle LGBTQ Bank Discrimination with a New
Credit Union, ABC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2019), [hereinafter Karma Allen] https://abcnews.go.com/US
/meet-man-hoping-battle-lgbtq-bank-discrimination-credit/story?id=65947300.
79. Id. See generally Mission, SUPERBIA, https://superbia.org/mission/ (last visited Apr. 18.
2021) (stating Superbia’s mission “to provide discrimination-free banking, life and health insurance,
and money management services designed for and by the LGBTQ community”).
80. See Press Release, Dallas Gay Alliance, Dallas Gay Alliance Forms Credit Union (Nov.
9, 1988) [hereinafter Dallas LGBTQ+ CU] https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc804590/
(announcing creation of state-chartered LGBTQ+ credit union in Dallas, TX in 1988); David Taffet,
Queer Banking, DALLAS VOICE (Apr. 30, 2021), https://dallasvoice.com/queer-banking/ (discussing
Dallas credit union and creation of Daylight bank, the first digital bank for LGBTQ+ community);
Alexandria White, Daylight Launches as the First LGBTQ+ Digital Banking Platform, CNBC (Nov.
18, 2020) https://www.cnbc.com/select/daylight-launches-as-the-first-lgbt-digital-banking-platform/
(highlighting creation of Daylight digital banking platform and services offered); Who We Are,
DAYLIGHT, https://joindaylight.com/who-we-are (last visited June 13, 2021) (providing background
information on Daylight bank and its mission); Peter Strozniak, Two LGBTQ CUs in the Works,
CREDIT UNION TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.cutimes.com/2018/11/30/two-lgbtqcus-in-the-works/?slreturn=20210513190435 (highlighting creation of Superbia, a San Francisco
group’s plan to file for charter with NCUA to hopefully open “LGBTQ[+] Federal Credit Union by
2023[,]” and history of Dallas credit union); Matt Baume, You Can Now Put Your Gay Money in a
Gay Bank, OUT (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.out.com/news/2019/9/11/you-can-now-put-your-gaymoney-gay-bank (spotlighting creation of Superbia, attempt to create LGBTQ+ Credit Union in
Washington State, and crediting Dallas Gay Alliance Credit Union as first LGBTQ+ financial
institution); Michelle MacKinnon, ‘This is the Time’ — Group Raising Funds to Form LGBTQ+
Credit Union, CAPITOL HILL SEATTLE BLOG (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.capitolhillseattle.com
/2018/02/this-is-the-time-group-raising-funds-to-form-lgbtq-credit-union/ (describing efforts to
create Washington state-chartered LGBTQ+ credit union and providing entity’s web address:
http://www.equalitywashington.org/); Equality Washington, The Campaign for Equality Credit
Union, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/the-campaign-for-equality-credit-union/x
/2119395#/ (last visited June 13, 2021) (fundraising for Equality Credit Union and describing the
institution’s goals for serving the LGBTQ+ community).
81. See Dallas LGBTQ+ CU, supra note 80; Taffet, supra note 80; Strozniak, supra note 80;
Baume, supra note 80.
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absorbed into another entity. 82 In addition to Superbia, there have been attempts
to create LGBTQ+ community-based institutions in San Francisco, Seattle, and
even a digital-only institution (Daylight). 83 Some of these attempts, such as the
Seattle institution, have failed, while others are still at various points in the startup
stage (currently underway in the chartering process or a charter has been approved
and the institutions are currently building infrastructure).84
Many community-based financial institutions will face significant regulatory
and operational obstacles to success. 85 Discussing all the various hurdles involved
with starting an LGBTQ+ community-based financial institution is beyond the
scope of this article, but there are some issues that are particularly relevant to the
LGBTQ+ community. The first issue relates to whether to charter as a
commercial bank or a credit union. Credit unions have been the more popular
institutional form due to credit unions having lower barriers to entry (regulatory
hurdles and capital requirements) than banks. 86 Unlike a bank, credit unions can
be chartered in a basic form (offering only checking and savings accounts) or fullservice (offering loans, check cashing, and retirement accounts), each with its
own unique chartering requirements. 87 Basic credit unions can convert to a fullservice credit union, allowing credit unions startups to capitalize on the easier
requirements (regulatory and capital) of the basic form and then converting to the
full-service form when it is strategically viable for the institution. 88 However, a
startup bank must meet the higher regulatory and capital requirements to be
chartered, giving the credit union form an advantage over a commercial bank
form in the startup phase. 89
Outside of the startup requirements, commercial banks do have an advantage
over credit unions because they can raise the required startup capital by issuing
shares of stock to investors who are willing to provide capital with the expectation
that they will receive a return on investment via dividends from profits. 90 Unlike
a bank, a credit union cannot sell shares of stock to the general public because of
82. See sources cited supra note 81.
83. See sources cited supra note 81.
84. See sources cited supra note 80.
85. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 65-91
(Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2017) (providing background on what is a “bank” and the various
forms of institutions).
86. See Telephone Interview with George Hofheimer, Owner, Hofheimer Strategy Advisors
(May 19, 2021) [hereinafter Holfheimer] (discussing Hofheimer’s experience and expertise in starting
credit unions and the associated challenges, his work associated with the Equality Washington Credit
Union, observations on why the Equality Washington effort failed, and general startup challenges
specific to a LGBTQ+ focused credit union); see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85 at 123-27 (discussing
requirements to form a bank); Philip Rodney Moon, How to Start a Credit Union Bank, SAPLING,
https://www.sapling.com/6884454/start-credit-union-bank (last visited July 17, 2021) (providing
summary of credit union startup requirements).
87. Moon, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. See sources cited supra note 86.
90. Hofheimer, supra note 86.
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its structure as a cooperative model; funding comes solely from member
shareholders. 91 Thus, the funding available to an LGBTQ+-focused credit union’s
funding from its members is likely to be tied to the interest and participation of
members of the community and its allies, the target market.
Whether there is a large enough market for a LGBTQ+ community-focused
institution (credit union or bank) will depend on the institution’s reach,
geographic location, and digital access and whether individuals can be convinced
to forgo the benefits associated with conducting business with larger, more
established institutions that have more physical locations and ATM access. 92
While the relocation of many African Americans to northern cities after the Civil
War ensured enough critical mass to support African American institutions, the
experience of the short-lived DGACU suggests that there may be a smaller target
for LGBTQ+ community banking. 93
The DGACU’s last NCUA Call Report stated that it “served 840 members
and managed assets of $525,000, 54 loans valued at more than $337,000, and total
shares and deposits of $442,996.” 94 Although the DGACU was created before the
advent of the internet, it seems unlikely that e-commerce would mitigate the
target market issue (while Daylight attempts to capitalize on a digital-only
approach, it also relies on a partnership with another established bank. Thus, it is
not a true independent bank that overcame the regulatory barriers to entry). 95
Without enough funding to provide a substantial number of customers with lines
of credit that can cover the cost of a mortgage, then a community-based institution
risks losing some or all of an individual’s business to other non-LGBTQ+
community-focused institutions that have the capital to provide those financial
services. Consequently, without community institutions, efforts to prevent
discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community may not be fully accomplished,
particularly the type of experiences that the transgender community experiences.
The Rosa case highlights another instance of transgender discrimination. 96 As
a transgender woman in 1998, Rosa experienced discrimination because she
dressed in a feminine manner and her identification documents listed her birth
gender as male. 97 When she went to a bank to request a mortgage application, the
employee refused to provide the application until Rosa went home and changed

91. See sources cited supra note 90.
92. See sources cited supra note 90.
93. BARADARAN, supra note 71, at 69-83 (discussing African Americans migration to
northern cities from 1910-70 influenced black community banks); Patrick Sisson, How Gay Bars
Have Been a Building Block of the LGBTQ Community, CURBED (July 17, 2016, 11:11AM), https://
archive.curbed.com/2016/6/17/11963066/gay-bar-history-stonewall-pulse-lgbtq (describing factors
that influenced LGBTQ+ community to congregate in large cities). But see Greggor Mattson, SmallCity Gay Bars, Big-City Urbanism, 19 SAGE J. CITY & CMTY 76, 76 (2020), https://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1111/cico.12443 (asserting impact of gay bars in small cities).
94. Strozniak, supra note 80.
95. Daylight, supra note 80 (stating FDIC deposit insurance is through MetaBank, N.A).
96. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
97. Id. at 214.
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her clothes to something more masculine to conform with the gender on her
identification. 98 Rosa’s initial complaint was dismissed at summary judgment;
the first circuit granted her appeal by reversing and remanding, suggesting that
ECOA might apply. However, the question of whether sexual orientation and
gender identity were protected under ECOA was not fully resolved. 99
That question arose again in 2007 when Adola DeWolf and Laura Watts,
domestic partners, tried to modify DeWolf’s mortgage to add Watts as a coowner. 100 After the couple complied with the bank’s directions, the bank notified
the couple that adding Watts to the deed was unauthorized and “threatened to
foreclose on the house if the almost $80,000 balance on the mortgage was not
paid in 30 days… [because the bank] did not recognize domestic partners as
family.” 101 This claim was settled though, so it did not resolve the question of
whether sexual orientation and gender identity were protected as forms of sex
discrimination under ECOA. 102
Countless LGBTQ+ individuals have no doubt encountered discrimination
that was similar to the experience of Rosa, DeWolf, and Watts in a “same script,
different cast” manner. 103 The transgender community is at particular risk for
discrimination because of issues relating to names and identification. 104 For
example, if a credit application requires the disclosure of alias credit identities,
the applicant would have to disclose their birth name, colloquially called a
deadname, and if this deadname highlights that they were a different gender at
birth, that can lead to discrimination based on gender identity. 105 The second issue
is that if the individual does not have identification that lists their name or gender
in a way that conforms with how the individual presents (obtaining such updated
identification is only possible in nineteen states), they may be denied credit. 106

98. Id.
99. See generally Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691; see also Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 1002 (2011); see Rosa, 214 F.3d 214 (displaying
no subsequent case history in Westlaw or Lexis online resources after the 1st Cir. decision).
100. DeWolf & Watts Summary, supra note 4.
101. Id.
102. DeWolf & Watts Summary, supra note 4; see also CFPB SAGE Letter, supra note 13.
103. WHITNEY HOUSTON & DEBORAH COX, SAME SCRIPT, DIFFERENT CAST (Arista Records
2000) (providing phrase via song title and meaning via song lyrics).
104. Issues, Identity Documents & Privacy, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL.,
[hereinafter Transgender Identification] https://transequality.org/issues/identity-documents-privacy
(last visited Apr. 18, 2021); See Jim Akin, How to Dispute a Name on your Credit Report, EXPERIAN:
ASK EXPERIAN (Jun. 4, 2020), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/how-to-dispute-aname-on-your-credit-report/ (discussing listing an individual’s alternate names in a credit report).
105. Akin, supra note 104; Deadname, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/e/popculture/deadname/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2021); see KC Clements, What is Deadnaming?, HEALTHLINE
(Sept. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Clements Deadnaming] https://www.healthline.com/health/transgender
/deadnaming (defining deadnaming and negative impacts of using a deadname).
106. Transgender Identification, supra note 104; Taylor Romine, New Jersey Ads ‘X’ gender
marker on Drivers’ Licenses and Other State Identification, CNN (Apr. 20, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/us/x-gender-drivers-license-new-jersey-trnd/index.html.
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Similar problems can arise in connection with the information contained in an
individual’s credit report. 107 The experiences of Rosa, DeWolff & Watts, and the
hypotheticals discussed in Part III are all examples of discrimination that is
unique to the LGBTQ+ community and clearly demonstrate the community’s
need for more concrete protections related to access to financial services.
D. CFPB’s Role in Consumer Finance
The CFPB, an agency created by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, is the primary
regulator for consumer financial protection. 108 The CFPB has primary oversight
over discrimination in financial services provided by larger banks and other nondeposit-taking financial institutions, like credit card companies and Quicken
Rocket Mortgage. 109 For banks that do not meet the statutory jurisdiction
threshold of $10 billion in assets, the institution’s primary regulator, either the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Reserve (FRB), or the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), oversees compliance with fair lending laws and the
CFPB’s rules and regulations. 110
In 2016, under former Director Richard Cordray, the CFPB indicated that
their legal analysis supported the argument that ECOA applied to sexual
orientation and gender identity as a form of sex discrimination. 111 However, once
President Trump was elected, it would have been highly unlikely for CFPB to
refer any cases involving ECOA and discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity to DOJ, given then-Attorney General Sessions’ Title VII
guidance on what “based on sex” meant. 112 After Cordray stepped down in
November of 2017, and the CFPB’s change in leadership to Acting Director Mick
Mulvaney and then-Director Kathy Kraninger during the Trump administration,

107. Spencer Watson, Trans & Queer Credit Reporting Issues, THE CTR. FOR LGBTQ ECON.
ADVANCEMENT (Mar. 15, 2021), https://lgbtq-economics.org/2021/03/05/trans-queer-credit-report-issueswith-billie-simmons-from-daylight/?fbclid=IwAR2goybgqeO9Wvld7AD6Py-jTRNPM9lcPRLD4jqyNC
_ye-RDWNirvb44Ml8 (discussing obstacles and challenges for transgender individuals related to the
information in their personal credit report reflecting their birth information, deadname and birth gender, and
not the individual’s actual identity).
108. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85 at 92-96 (discussing U.S. financial regulators, their
jurisdiction, and their missions).
109. See id. at 93 (discussing CFPB’s financial regulation role); Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1144-46 (2012) (discussing CFPB’s background and purpose); Patricia
McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103
MINN. L. REV. 2543, 2610 (2019) (discussing CFPB’s role in consumer protection).
110. See sources cited supra note 109.
111. CFPB SAGE Letter, supra note 13.
112. See CFPB SAGE Letter, supra note 13; Sessions Memo, supra note 13.
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it was unclear whether the CFPB maintained or rescinded its earlier position on
sexual orientation and gender identity as a possible form of sex discrimination. 113
III. POTENTIAL CHANGES TO FAIR LENDING STATUTES
OR REGULATIONS AND POSSIBLE IMPACTS
Although addressing discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community is a
relatively new application of fair lending law, an examination of the application
of fair lending to other minority groups is instructive. 114 All of these fair lending
laws were passed after the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1964. 115 The majority
of these laws were intended to supplement the two Civil Rights laws in achieving
their purposes of battling discrimination. 116 Many of the laws focused on
mortgages and housing because buying a home is usually a consumer’s most
significant and expensive purchase, and all are supplemented by additional
regulations and guidance promulgated by various financial regulators. 117 Some of
the statutes are universal; others are mortgage-specific. 118 The statutes most
relevant to the provision of financial services to the LGBTQ+ community are
discussed here.
A. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)
The CRA requires federal financial regulators to examine a financial
institution’s record of meeting the needs of all the individuals who live in the

113. See Barbara S. Mishkin, Second Circuit Decision Could Support ECOA Protection for
Sexual Orientation, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/02/28/second-circuit-decision-could-support-ecoaprotection-for-sexual-orientation/ (noting that since “President Trump’s appointment of Mick
Mulvaney as Acting Director, the CFPB ha[d] not yet taken a position on th[e] issue”). See generally
Avie Schneider, Richard Cordray Stepping Down as Head of U.S. Consumer Protection Agency, NPR
(Nov. 15, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/15/564349200/richardcordray-stepping-down-as-head-of-u-s-consumer-protection-agency; Emily Sullivan, Senate
Confirms Kathy Kraninger as CFPB Director, NPR (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/06
/673222706/senate-confirms-kathy-kraninger-as-cfpb-director. But see CFPB SAGE Letter, supra
note 13.
114. See generally The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 15 U.S.C § 1639; 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617; Home Mortgage and
Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810; Community Reinvestment Act (CRA),
12 U.S.C § 2901; Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691; Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act of 1977 (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692; Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31.
115. See generally Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§
2601-2617; Home Mortgage and Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810;
Community Reinvestment Act(CRA), 12 U.S.C § 2901; Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA), 15
U.S.C. § 1601; Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681; Home Ownership and Protection
Act of 1994 (HOEPA), 15 U.S.C. §1602; Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691;
Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31.
116. See id.
117. See id. See also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85 at 551-52 (defining UDAP and UDAAP).
118. See sources cited supra notes 115, 117.
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institution’s service area while balancing the institution’s safety and soundness
requirements. 119 The CRA is one of the few consumer protection statutes that
does not fall under the CFPB’s jurisdiction. 120
Part of the reason for passing the CRA in 1977 was to eliminate the practice
of redlining. 121 First defined in the 1960s, redlining is “an illegal practice where
people living in a certain area or neighborhood are not given the same access to
credit as people in other areas or neighborhoods based on. . . [a] prohibited
reason. Though the practice has been illegal for decades, it still goes on today.” 122
While discrimination on the basis of geographic location is not prohibited in and
of itself, the purpose of redlining was usually to avoid neighborhoods where the
residents were mostly racial minorities or had some other protected status. 123 If
the reason for avoiding a geographic location is purely to avoid a protected class,
then the redlining is an illegal activity. 124 However, if an institution decides not
to offer loans to anyone from specific neighborhoods and the residents of those
neighborhoods are mostly racial minorities, a seemingly neutral geographic
policy would have a disparate impact of discriminating based on race. 125
Conversely, if an institution targets a neighborhood to charge higher rates or
provide access to financial services on unfair terms, the action is known as reverse
redlining. 126
While there is not a direct enforcement mechanism for a violation of the CRA,
there are negative consequences if a bank’s CRA record is poor. 127 The bank’s
regulator will consider the bank’s CRA record in the context of any actions that
require the regulator’s approval and can use an unacceptable CRA record to deny
requests that require regulatory approval. 128 Such requests might relate to
expansion or closing plans, appointing new board members, or changing the

119. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85 at 562-71 (providing background on CRA’s purpose, its
financial regulation role, and “the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agencies” enforce it); see
Kennedy et al., supra note 109 at 1148-49 (discussing CFPB’s jurisdiction and the associated statutes).
120. Id.
121. Daniel Dodd-Ramirez & Patrice A. Ficklin, Redlining: CFPB and DOJ Action Requires
BancorpSouth Bank to Pay Millions to Harmed Consumers, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU:
BLOG (Jun. 29, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/redlining-cfpb-and-dojaction-requires-bancorpsouth-bank-pay-millions-harmed-consumers/ (defining redlining). See Adam
Hayes, Redlining, INVESTOPEDIA [hereinafter Redlining] https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r
/redlining.asp (last visited Nov. 2019) (providing background on redlining and reverse redlining).
122. Dodd-Ramirez & Ficklin, supra note 121; see Redlining, supra note 121.
123. See Dodd-Ramirez & Ficklin, supra note 121; see Redlining, supra note 121.
124. Dodd-Ramirez & Ficklin, supra note 121; Redlining, supra note 121.
125. See Mayer Brown, CFPB Sues First Non-Bank Mortgage Lender for Alleged Redlining,
Fair Lending Newsletter Fall 2020 at 7.
126. See Dodd-Ramirez & Ficklin, supra note 121 (defining redlining); Redlining, supra note
121.
127. See Dodd-Ramirez & Ficklin, supra note 121 at 19; see Redlining, supra note 121.
128. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 562 (discussing CRA approval requirement for any
action that requires approval of financial institution’s primary regulator).
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home office or individual branch locations. 129 Should sexual orientation and
gender identity gain explicit protection, a financial institution that exhibits
behavior indicative of the new forms of redlining or reverse redlining against the
LGBTQ+ community faces a serious business risk. 130
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
Effective in 1974, ECOA “prohibits discrimination in lending on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age, or because a
person receives public assistance or has exercised a right under certain consumer
protection laws.” 131 Regulation B provides the rules that institutions must comply
with to avoid violating ECOA. 132 Since the authority for enforcing ECOA was
transferred from FRB to the CFPB, the CFBP has vigorously asserted that
redlining is a violation of ECOA. 133
If an institution engages in redlining or reverse redlining, the institution could
be at risk of an ECOA violation in addition to having CRA problems. 134 The
CFPB has pursued cases where an institution inappropriately excluded minority
neighborhoods from its service area. 135 Naturally, any action with the actual intent
to discriminate is a violation of ECOA. 136 Additionally, practices that appear to
be facially neutral but have a discriminatory effect or impact, known as disparate
impact or treatment, can also trigger an ECOA violation. 137 However, there is an
exception for a bona fide credit underwriting standard that may have such a
disparate impact. 138 One noteworthy case was the CFPB’s claim against
BancorpSouth Bank, in which the CFPB alleged that the entity “was illegally
129. See id.
130. See Redlining, supra note 121; Sun & Gao, supra note 8; see infra Part III Sections b-c, g.
131. Kennedy et al., supra note 109 at 1148 (describing ECOA’s purpose); see Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
132. Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B); 86 Fed. Reg. 14363 (Mar. 16, 2021) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002); CFPB ECOA Announcement, supra note 18.
133. Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Reach Settlement with
BancorpSouth Bank to Resolve Allegations of Mortgage Lending Discrimination, DEP’T OF JUST.:
JUSTICE NEWS (June 29, 2016) [hereinafter ECOA Redlining] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-and-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-reach-settlement-bancorpsouth (announcing
settlement and consent order under ECOA related to redlining actions); CARNELL ET AL., supra note
85, at 512 (discussing redlining under CRA and CFPB’s interpretation it violates ECOA); see DoddRamirez & Ficklin, supra note 121, at 19.
134. See ECOA Redlining, supra note 133; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 512 (providing
redlining background and CFPB’s claim it violates ECOA); see generally Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691; Kennedy et al., supra note 109, at 1148 (providing ECOA’s purpose).
135. See ECOA Redlining, supra note 133; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 512; DoddRamirez & Ficklin, supra note 121.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691; Kennedy et al., supra note 109 at 1148.
137. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 509 (discussing proof of direct harm not necessary and
disparate impact gives standing for discrimination claim).
138. Id. (stating bona fide underwriting standards that result in a disproportionate rate for the
denial of credit to a protected class may be permissible under the effects test).
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redlining predominantly minority neighborhoods in” Memphis; the result was a
settlement of $10 million in monetary relief and the institution’s commitment to
spend at least $800,000 on community outreach programs. 139 Institutions not
under the CFPB’s jurisdiction face the same risk if their primary regulator adopts
CFPB’s approach. 140 For example, a regulator might find that an institution
discriminates against heterosexuals by charging them more interest for living in
a gay neighborhood and then pursue a reverse redlining claim against the
institution. In doing so, the regulator would establish that redlining against the
LGBTQ+ community violates ECOA. 141
Beyond redlining, there are other ways for a financial institution to become
liable for an ECOA violation. 142 Individual lending decisions based on a protected
status like race, gender, or marital status are all prohibited. 143 ECOA caps a claim
for a single violation at $10,000 and caps class action lawsuits at the lesser of
$500,000 or one percent of the institution’s net worth. 144 Thus, a financial
institution that violates ECOA could face an enforcement action from a regulator,
a private claim from an impacted individual, or a class-action claim from a group
of impacted individuals. 145
In 2013, the CFPB ordered one financial institution to pay $80 million in
damages for a violation of ECOA in addition to $18 million in penalties. 146 Now
that sexual orientation and gender identity have protection under ECOA as a
result of CFPB’s interpretive rule, any institution that charges an applicant a
higher level of interest because of the applicant’s sexual orientation or gender
identity might face similar penalties. 147 Since ECOA creates liability for
intentional discrimination as well as disparate impact, institutions risk legal action
for any intentional discriminatory actions based on sexual orientation or gender
identity and for any seemingly facially neutral policy that has a disproportionate
impact based on either trait. 148 The CFPB’s interpretive rule also addresses the

139. ECOA Redlining, supra note 133.
140. See sources cited supra note 134.
141. See sources cited supra note 134.
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (establishing ECOA’s scope and civil liabilities); see also 12 C.F.R.
§ 1002.16 (2021) (defining ECOA’s enforcement penalties and liabilities).
143. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16 (2021) (defining ECOA’s enforcement penalties and liabilities).
144. See id.
145. See id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (establishing ECOA’s scope and civil liabilities).
146. CFPB and DOJ Order Ally to Pay $80 Million to Consumers Harmed by Discriminatory Auto
Loan Pricing, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter ECOA Offense]
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-ally-to-pay-80-million-toconsumers-harmed-by-discriminatory-auto-loan-pricing/, (illustrating penalties against Ally Financial and
Ally Bank for violation of ECOA).
147. See id.; Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B); 86 Fed. Reg. 14363 (Mar. 16, 2021) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002); CFPB ECOA Announcement, supra note 18.
148. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 509 (discussing proof of direct harm not necessary and
disparate impact gives standing for discrimination claim); see sources cited supra notes 146-147.
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type of discrimination that Ms. Rosa, DeWolf, and Watts experienced: according
to the CFPB, these actions now violate ECOA. 149
Under the Biden Administration, the CFPB may choose to build on its current
informal interpretive rule with additional interpretive or formal rules. 150 One
possibility could be the required rulemaking under section 1071 of Dodd-Frank,
which deals with small-business lending data. 151 Should sexual orientation and
gender identity become data points that must be reported in accordance with
section 1071, financial institutions can be held liable under the ECOA interpretive
rule if that data suggests discrimination based on either status that impacts
LGBTQ+ small businesses. Other sources of data, including those collected under
HMDA, may also inform enforcement actions under the new interpretive rule. 152
C. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
HMDA requires most lenders to collect, maintain, and report data about their
mortgage lending. 153 The HMDA datasets serve as a vital source of information
to federal regulators and the general public, enabling them to identify potential
discrimination. 154 The current HMDA datasets consist of forty-eight data points
(including loan type, amount, property address, and applicant’s race, ethnicity,
and sex) that include certain protected statuses. 155 During Cordray’s leadership,
the CFPB designated new mandatory HMDA data points (total points and fees,
loan term, loan originator ID, property value, and credit score), some of which
are mandated by Dodd-Frank and others designated through CFPB’s
discretionary power. 156 However, just before the requirement went into effect in
2018, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted regulatory relief that
exempted eighty-five percent of banks from reporting the HMDA data points
mandated by Dodd-Frank. 157 Under Acting Director Mulvaney, the
circumvention was expanded when the CFPB adopted “an interpretive and

149. See CFPB ECOA Announcement, supra note 18.
150. See infra Part IV Section b.
151. See Small Business Lending Data Collection Rulemaking, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/1071-rule/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020) (documenting purpose of
CFPB’s rulemaking for section 1071 of Dodd-Frank and rulemaking’s status in the process).
152. See infra Part III Sections c, g.
153. Kennedy et al., supra note 109 at 1149 (explaining HMDA).
154. Id.; see McCoy, supra note 109 at 2581-82 (discussing HMDA data set importance and
arbitrage of new data point regulation).
155. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORTABLE HMDA DATA: A REGULATORY AND
REPORTING OVERVIEW REFERENCE CHART, 3-5, 8, 11, 16 (2020) [hereinafter HMDA Data List] https://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_reportable-hmda-data_regulatory-and-reporting-overviewreference-chart-2019.pdf (listing and defining current HMDA data points).
156. 80 Fed. Reg. 66287 n. 501 (Oct. 28, 2015) (listing Dodd-Frank mandated HMDA data
points); McCoy, supra note 109 at 2581-82
157. Id. at 2582.
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procedural rule” that exempted most of the same institutions from reporting the
new discretionary data points. 158
Although HMDA data does not include sexual orientation or gender identity,
there are three studies, two academic ones by Dillbary & Edwards and Sun &
Gao, and one by the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), that
used HMDA data to identify indicators of potential discrimination against the
LGBTQ+ community for mortgage loans. 159 Dillbary & Edwards found that
compared to white heterosexual applicants, applications from “same-sex male
coapplicants . . . are between 2.5 and 7.5 percentage points less likely to” be
approved and that the denial rates were higher for minority and mixed-race
couples, with additional variability based on the race of the primary applicant. 160
Female co-applicants appeared to be treated the same but replicated the same
race-based issues as the findings for men. 161 Both the NCRC and Sun & Gao
studies found that same-sex applicants were charged higher interest rates than
heterosexual borrowers, and Sun & Gao found a specific range of 0.02-0.20
percent. 162 Additionally, the Sun & Gao study asserted that there are spillover
effects that impact heterosexual couples residing in neighborhoods with a higher
population of same-sex couples, an indicator of reverse redlining. 163 Finally, the
Sun & Gao study also developed a proposed method to infer sexual orientation
for identifying discriminatory practices. 164 They proposed this method as an
alternative to asking applicants to “out” themselves by disclosing their sexual
orientation and gender identity. 165
However, because sexual orientation and gender identity are not HMDA data
points, the studies had to infer sexual orientation, all based on an initial
assumption that same-sex applicants were LGBTQ+ couples. 166 Their findings
are sufficient for academic purposes and a legal claim about discrimination based
on sex but may not be enough for a legal claim related to LGBTQ+
discrimination; the result of this is the chance of such claims being dismissed
(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56). 167 To have a concrete finding

158. Id.
159. See Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8 at 4 (using HMDA data to identify trends of
LGBTQ+ discrimination in lending); Sun & Gao, supra note 8; Richardson & Kali, supra note 8;
Lederer & Lilien, supra note 8.
160. Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8 at 5-6.
161. Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8 at 6.
162. Sun & Gao, supra note 8.
163. Sun & Gao, supra note 8; see Redlining, supra note 121.
164. Sun & Gao, supra note 8.
165. Id.; see infra Part V Section c.
166. HMDA Data List, supra note 155 (omitting sexual orientation and gender identity);
Richardson & Kali, supra note 8 (stating no way to identify same-sex couples using HMDA data);
Sun & Gao, supra note 8 (stating no requirement to disclose sexual orientation).
167. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (finding
complaint must plead sufficient facts to state a claim); Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007)
(finding claim must put forward enough factual information that is plausible discovery will reveal
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requires data that reflects the actual sexual orientation and gender identity of the
consumers. 168
Under the Biden Administration, it is possible that sexual orientation and
gender identity could become HMDA data points in a future update. 169 If this
happens, it is probable that, like race and gender, consumers will not have to
disclose their sexual orientation and gender identity as mandatory data points, but
institutions will have to report any data that is voluntarily disclosed. 170 Should an
institution be found to have falsified these data points, the institution would also
be subject to penalties. 171 Additionally, intentional manipulation of HMDA data
could result in penalties under ECOA. 172 If it is possible to correct the
manipulated HMDA data, the result could reveal discriminatory lending practices
that violate ECOA. 173 Should the data correction reveal an ECOA violation, the
institution could face enforcement action from the CFPB, the institution’s
primary regulator, or individual claims from applicants because ECOA allows
private claims, or a combination of claims. 174
To provide an example of the potential consequence of HMDA violations, in
the summer of 2019, CFPB took enforcement action against a lender, Freedom
Mortgage Corporation, one of the ten largest HMDA reporters. 175 For the years
between 2014-2017, the lender inaccurately reported HMDA data in addition to
falsifying HMDA data when applicants chose not to disclose their race or
ethnicity. 176 While the action did not go to trial because the lender decided to
settle the case, it had to work to improve its compliance program and pay a civil
penalty of $1.75 million for the reporting inaccuracies. 177

evidence); Richardson & Kali, supra note 8 (providing the study’s methodology); Dillbary &
Edwards, supra note 8 at 4–5 (discussing how HMDA allowed analysis based on perceived LGBQ+
couples); Sun & Gao, supra note 8, at 9295 (overestimating by assuming all same-sex applicants are
LGBTQ+).
168. See sources cited supra note 167.
169. See infra notes 272-278 and accompanying text.
170. See HMDA Data List, supra note 155, at 11-17 (demonstrating applicants not required to
disclose race or gender and providing guidance to financial institutions on reporting race and gender
based on if the applicant did or did not disclose).
171. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Settles with Freedom Mortgage Corporation,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 05, 2019) [hereinafter HDMA Offense], https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-settles-freedom-mortgage-corporation/.
172. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691; Kennedy et al., supra note
109, at 1148 (providing ECOA’s purpose); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 509 (discussing proof
of direct harm not necessary and disparate impact gives standing for discrimination claim).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16 (2021).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16 (2021).
175. See HDMA Offense, supra note 171.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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D. The Fair Housing Act (FHA)
The FHA prohibits taking actions based on race, color, national origin,
religion, sex, familial status, or handicap status for various mortgage financing
and insurance-related activities, including terms, conditions, valuation, and
certain underlying factors and data points. 178 This prohibition also covers the loan
purchasing activities of financial institutions. 179 The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), not CFPB, enforces the FHA. 180 However, because
there is an overlap between the FHA and the statutes under CFPB’s jurisdiction,
discriminatory actions related to mortgage financing could result in enforcement
actions from one or both agencies, either individually or by joint action. 181
The LGBTQ+ community already has some protections under the FHA via
HUD’s 2012 Equal Access Rule, a formal rule adopted through the notice and
comment process. 182 The rule prohibits discrimination against members of the
community in access to any HUD program, like the FHA’s mortgage insurance
programs. 183 After Bostock, HUD issued a policy memo, the equivalent of an
informal interpretive rule, to implement the guidance in Executive Order
13,988. 184 Acting Assistant Secretary Worden for HUD’s Office of Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) stated that the scope of the Equal Access Rule
was too narrow to properly comply with the guidance in EO 13,988. 185 Next, the
memo stated that FHEO would accept all complaints of discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity within its jurisdiction. 186 Finally, the memo
outlined other FHEO policy changes related to activities that intersect with the
FHA’s prohibition on sex discrimination, investigations of complaints with
multiple protected statuses, and the impact on agreements with state or local
agencies and non-government entities that work with HUD. 187 Thus, it is possible
that HUD will take additional steps to implement EO 13,988, clarify FHEO’s
178. Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31.
179. Id.
180. Id. at § 3608.
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16 (2021); see supra notes 133-149 and
accompanying text; Kennedy et al., supra note 109, at 1148 (providing ECOA’s purpose).
182. See Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or
Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5662, 5662 (Feb. 03, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Equal Access Rule]
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 200, 203, 236, 400, 570, 574, 882, 891, 892) (summarizing Equal Access
Rule’s purpose was to prevent discrimination against LGBTQ+ consumers in access to HUD
programs).
183. Id.
184. See EO 13,988, supra note 15; Memorandum from Jeanine M. Worden, Acting Assistant
Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev., to Off. Of Fair Hous.
& Equal Opportunity; Fair. Hous. Assist. Prog. Agencies; U.S. Dep’t Hous. and Urb. Dev., Fair Hous.
Initiatives Program Grantees (Feb. 11, 2021) [hereinafter HUD Memo], https://www.hud.gov/sites
/dfiles/FHEO/documents/WordenMemoEO13988FHActImplementation.pdf; see infra Part IV
Section b.
185. HUD Memo, supra note 184, at 2.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id. at 2-3.
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policy memo, or take joint action with CFPB if there is a statute that requires
inter-agency collaboration to promulgate a rule.
E. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
The FCRA establishes requirements and governs the behavior of consumer
reporting agencies (CRAs), entities that use credit reports, and entities that furnish
information (furnisher(s)) to the CRAs. 188 Access to credit reports is restricted to
individuals who have a specific need for the information, and if the user of credit
information takes an adverse action based on information in a credit report, the
user must notify the consumer and provide a copy of the report. 189 The adverse
action requirement is universal and applies to actions relating to existing credit
relationships as well as new credit applications. 190
The FCRA also entitles consumers to obtain a free copy of their credit report
once a year from each of the three nationwide credit bureaus. 191 Should a
consumer discover incorrect information in their report, the reporting agency is
obligated to make reasonable efforts to work with the consumer to remediate the
situation and notate that the item is in dispute on the credit report until the issue
is resolved. 192 However, what constitutes a reasonable effort is not defined. 193
Usually, remediation of incorrect information involves interacting with the
information’s furnisher since the FCRA legally requires a furnisher to provide
accurate information to CRAs. 194 When a consumer contacts a furnisher about
incorrect data, the furnisher must conduct a reasonable investigation and, if the
information is incorrect, correct the issue with the appropriate CRAs. 195 However,
like the requirement for CRAs, what is a “reasonable investigation” is not
defined. 196
Outside of correcting the information, there are few remedies for FCRA
violations. 197 There is no private right of action if a user of credit information
takes an adverse action and does not give the consumer a copy of the credit
report. 198 Additionally, consumers cannot make a private claim against furnishers

188. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
189. Id. at §§ 1681b, m(a).
190. See Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 60-63 (2007) (holding adverse actions
can happen with initial applications for credit).
191. See sources cited supra note 109.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(f); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 521-22 (discussing CRA
obligations for disputes to items on a consumer’s credit report).
193. See sources cited supra note 192.
194. See id. § 1681s-2(a).
195. 15 C.F.R. § 1022.43.
196. Id.
197. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 528 (discussing remedies for FCRA violations).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h).
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under federal or state law. 199 Some provisions of the FCRA can be enforced via
civil action, usually when there is a willful or negligent violation, and consumers
may be eligible to recover damages with a cap and reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs. 200 However, some courts allow plaintiffs to circumvent the caps via
damages for emotional harm or distress. 201
While FCRA’s purpose is not about combating discriminatory lending
practices, if the CFPB required the collection of sexual orientation and gender
identity data, it is possible that the credit reporting agencies could start collecting
and reporting the data as well. Should the CRAs report these new data points, the
FCRA could serve as another source of data for identifying discriminatory
practices against the LGBTQ+ community. Additionally, if furnishers and CRAs
begin to collect and report sexual orientation and gender identity, there could be
liability related to adverse actions for willful or negligent disclosure of the data. 202
With regard to transgender individuals specifically, there can be issues if the
credit report reflects the individual’s birth gender or deadname. 203 Because credit
reports are commonly pulled for any application for credit, and sometimes for
housing applications, the conspicuous discrepancy related to gender information
and deadname could easily facilitate an act of discrimination that could ultimately
be remedied under the FCRA and ECOA. 204
F. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
Enacted in 1977, the FDCPA provides protection to consumers by creating
certain standards of conduct for debt collectors. 205 Debt collectors are defined as
any individual who collects debt on behalf of another party, so the FDCPA does
not apply to a financial institution with its own internal debt collection group. 206
These protections include a prohibition on making false representations;
harassing the consumer at work, in public, and at unreasonable hours; using
obscene language; and using or threatening violence. 207
In addition to enforcement by a federal regulator, consumers have a private
right of action for a violation of the FDCPA that can provide damages
representing the actual monetary loss that resulted from the harmful act and

199. See Purcell v. Bank of America, 659 F.3d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
FCRA preempts state law claims based on reporting information to consumer reporting agencies);
accord Macpherson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 665 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2011).
200. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, o.
201. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 528 (discussing remedies for FCRA violations).
202. See id.
203. See sources cited supra notes 104, 107; see also Clements Deadnaming, supra note 105.
204. See sources cited supra note 203; see also sources cited supra notes 131-152 and
accompanying text.
205. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
206. See id. § 1692a.
207. Id. §§ 1692c-e.
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reasonable attorney’s fees. 208 The FDCPA allows for extra damages for
individual and class action claims based on the frequency and nature of noncompliance and if the actions were intentional. 209 Finally, FDCPA violations are
also unfair or deceptive acts or practices under UDAP and UDAAP (which will
be discussed shortly), creating the risk of individual or joint enforcement from
the FTC and CFPB. 210
While the FDCPA language does not explicitly mention protected status, it is
possible for actions based on protected status to trigger a violation of the
FDCPA. 211 Hate language against the LGBTQ+ community while attempting to
collect the debt could qualify as obscene language. 212 Additionally, should the
debt collector know that the individual is not out, threats of outing or confronting
the individual in public while referencing their sexual orientation or gender
identity would qualify as harassment. 213 Finally, a court may consider actions that
are based on a protected status as aggravating factors for awarding additional
damages. 214
G. Unfair, Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) and
Unfair, Deceptive or Abusive Acts and Practices (UDAAP)
CFPB has primary authority in defining and regulating UDAAP. 215 UDAAP
grew out of the original term “Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices” (UDAP),
introduced by the Wheeler-Lee Act of 1938 that modified the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act) of 1914. 216 After the 2007 financial crisis, Section
1031 of Dodd-Frank added the term “abusive” to create UDAAP and delegated
authority to CFPB. 217
i. UDAP
The FTC still has responsibility for UDAP, and the FTC’s guidance on the
definitions of unfair and deceptive and the associated case law also applies to
UDAAP. 218 The unfairness standard originates from Section 5 of the FTC Act
(enacted as Section 45), but additional guidance comes from In the Matter of Int’l
208. Id. § 1692k.
209. Id.
210. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85 at 547 (stating FDCPA violations are also unfair or
deceptive); see infra Part III Section g.
211. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d-e.
212. See id. § 1692d(2).
213. See id. § 1692d.
214. See id. § 1692k.
215. See generally, CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85 at 551-52 (providing background on UDAP
and UDAAP).
216. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
217. See sources cited supra notes 215-216.
218. See sources cited supra notes 215-216.
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Harvester Co. 219 The unfairness standard is a three-pronged test that consists of
the following: (1) an act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury,
(2) consumers cannot reasonably avoid the injury, and (3) the injury is not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. 220 One
example of such a violation would be an app store refusing to provide a refund
after a child is able to use their parent’s phone to go on an accidental shopping
spree because a password was not required after an initial purchase. 221
The deception standard comes from Section 5 of the FTC Act, the
administrative decision in Cliffdale Associates, Inc. 222 and a policy statement
from the FTC that appended Cliffdale. 223 The deception standard is a threepronged test requiring: (1) a representation, omission, or practice, express or
implied (including partial omissions), that is likely to mislead; (2) a targeted
consumer acting in a reasonable manner for the circumstances, and (3) the action
in question must be material, i.e., likely to influence the consumer’s choice.224
Under Cliffdale, the second prong creates liability for any reasonable response to
the facts. 225
Most of the FTC deception case law revolves around issues like hidden fees,
required information being dispersed across documents making it difficult for a
consumer to compile and understand, and misrepresentations or false assertations
about the product or service. 226 However, deception can also relate to data
collection and usage. For example, the FTC brought an action against a mobile
phone app developer who created a seemingly harmless flashlight program that
accessed data on the user’s phone without their knowledge or permission and sent
information back to the developer. 227
There have been many enforcement actions against financial service
providers for things like hidden fees, lack of notice on transaction restrictions,
and distribution of consumer financial transaction data. 228 For example, in 2018,
219. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
220. See sources cited supra note 219; 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (stating standard of proof).
221. FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL 10654030, at *8-12 (W.D. Wash.
July 22, 2016) (finding not refunding unauthorized app store charges by children and not placing
proper precautions to prevent such charges a violation of unfairness standard).
222. Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984).
223. Robert Freer, Commissioner, FTC, Address before the Proprietary Association: the
Wheeler-Lea Act (May 17, 1938) (creating UDAP authority by amending section 5 of FTC Act); see
15 U.S.C. § 45(a); Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110at (finding liability for disseminating deceptive
advertisements).
224. Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 165 (1984).
225. Id.
226. See e.g., F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 29 F.Supp.3d 1338 (D. Nev. 2014) (charging multiple
finance fees when advertised only one fee); see also, e.g., Goldenshores Technologies, LLC., C-4446
(FTC 2014) (decision and order) (finding flashlight app accessed and shared data from user’s device
to vendor without any notice or consent was deceptive).
227. Goldenshores Technologies, LLC., C-4446 (FTC 2014) (decision and order).
228. See id.; see Paypal, Inc., C-4651 (FTC 2018) (complaint) (finding Venmo’s act of delaying
required verifications of transactions until user requested funds be sent to their bank account resulting
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the FTC and CFPB took action against PayPal for the actions of its subsidiary
company, Venmo. 229 The first issue was that Venmo did not conduct the required
verifications for transactions between users until a user requested that the funds
be transferred to their bank, which resulted in reversals of transactions that the
consumer thought were completed. 230 In other words, the consumer was deceived
into thinking that they had the funds in their Venmo account. 231 The second issue
involved transaction history privacy. 232 Every Venmo transaction has a privacy
option: public, visible to friends, or private and only visible to the two users. 233
However, Venmo did not notify users that both parties needed to take action to
make a transaction private; a user’s action only impacted their friends, and friends
of a user who did not mark the transaction as private could still see it. 234
Recently, the FTC issued informal guidance indicating that the actions of AIs
that result in discrimination based on race are illegal UDAP actions, supporting a
line of legal argument that some consumer advocates have started to make. 235 If
an AI’s actions against one protected class can be discriminatory and illegal, it is
possible that this line of reasoning could be extended to the LGBTQ+
community. 236
Concrete protections under UDAP could create liability for financial
institutions if they engaged in activities like advertising as LGBTQ+ friendly but
charging those consumers more for financial services compared to other similarly

in reversal of improper transactions and requiring both parties to designate a transaction as private
while not notifying users of the requirement was deceptive).
229. Paypal, Inc., C-4651 (FTC 2018) (complaint).
230. Id. at paras. 10-16.
231. Id.
232. Id. at paras. 17-34.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Elisa Jillson, Aiming for Truth, Fairness, and Equity in Your Company’s Use of
AI, FTC (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2021/04/aimingtruth-fairness-equity-your-companys-use-ai; Ian Weiner, FTC Declares Racially Biased Algorithms
in Artificial Intelligence Unfair and Deceptive, Prohibited by Law, LAW’S COMM. FOR C. R. UNDER
L. (Apr. 20, 2021), https://lawyerscommittee.org/ftc-declares-racially-biased-algorithms-in-artificialintelligence-unfair-and-deceptive-prohibited-by-law/; STUDENT BORROWER PROTECTION CTR.
(SBPC), DISCRIMINATION IS “UNFAIR” INTERPRETING UDA(A)P TO PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION 4
(2021) [hereinafter “SBPC UDAP”], https://protectborrowers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04
/Discrimination_is_Unfair.pdf (asserting that an AI’s actions that discriminate against a protected
class qualifies as UDAP); Stephen Hayes & Kali Schellenberg, Leveraging UDA(A)P in the Fight
Against Discrimination, SBPC (Apr. 22, 2021) https://protectborrowers.org/leveraging-udaap-in-thefight-against-discrimination/ (discussing SBPC Report on AI and UDAP); SBPC, EDUCATIONAL
REDLINING, 15-19, (Feb. 2020) [hereinafter “Upstart Report”], https://protectborrowers.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/Education-Redlining-Report.pdf (asserting discrimination in AI decisions
for student loans).
236. See Jillison, supra note 235; see SBPC UDAP, supra note 235; see Hayes & Schellenberg,
supra note 235; see Upstart Report, supra note 235.
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situated heterosexual applicants. 237 This type of action would qualify as a
violation of both the unfairness and deception standards and a violation of
ECOA. 238 Another possibility is accessing and or sharing consumer data without
their consent, like the case about the flashlight app. 239 Sharing consumer data that
discloses sexual orientation or gender identity with or without notice could result
in a UDAP or UDAAP violation and enforcement action from the FTC, CFPB,
or both. 240
ii. UDAAP
The FTC’s guidance on the definitions of unfair and deceptive and the
associated case law also apply to UDAAP under the CFPB. 241 As to the
abusiveness standard, CFPB has not created any regulations that further define
“abusiveness.” 242 The CFPB has recognized the challenge of creating a fully
defined, exhaustive list of abusive acts or practices and recognized that if such a
list were created, it could be easy to evade. 243 As a result, the CFPB has provided
guidance on what constitutes “abusiveness” on a case-by-case basis through its
enforcement actions. 244 Although the CFPB under Former Director Kraninger
released guidance that attempted to define “abusiveness,” the CFPB rescinded
that guidance in 2021, under the leadership of Acting Director David Uejio, and
announced a return to regulation by enforcement for UDAAP. 245
One thing that is unclear from the policy change is whether the CFPB will
return to the same decision process established under Cordray, or if Uejio, or a
new director, will create new standards. The possibility of a new approach makes
it hard to predict how discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender

237. See F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00536-GMN, 2015 WL 4073192, at *1 (D.
Nev. July 2, 2015); see also case cite supra note 227.
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also supra notes 122-149 and accompanying text.
239. See sources cited supra notes 227, 228.
240. See In the Matter of Paypal, Inc., C-4651 (FTC 2018) (complaint); infra notes 241-248
and accompanying text.
241. See supra, notes 215-240 and accompanying text
242. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 551-52 (providing background on UDAP and UDAAP
and CFPB’s original practice of regulation by enforcement for UDAAP).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau , Statement of Policy Regarding Prohibition on
Abusive Acts or Practices 1, 15 (2020) [hereinafter CFPB Abusiveness Framework
Announcement], https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_abusiveness-enforcementpolicy_statement.pdf (providing CFPB’s framework and standards for the definition of
“abusiveness” under Kraninger and the reasoning for the definition); Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Rescinds Abusiveness Policy Statement to Better Protect Consumers,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us
/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-rescinds-abusiveness-policy-statement-tobetter-protect-consumers/; see CFPB ECOA Announcement, supra note 18 (documenting Uejio’s
status as CFPB’s Acting Director).
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identity could put a financial institution at risk of enforcement action under
UDAAP. 246 However, it is possible that the CFPB could claim that discriminatory
practices based on sexual orientation or gender identity that violate the unfairness
or deceptive standards, like those discussed under UDAP, could also be abusive
if the action was routine or pervasive. 247 Additionally, regardless of whether the
CFPB mirrors the FTC’s posture on AIs and UDAP, CFPB may find a strategy
that classifies AI discrimination as abusive under UDAAP. 248
H. State-Level Laws and Regulations Serving as a Resource and Inspiration
Some financial institutions may have already dealt with liabilities arising
from state-level laws that protect the LGBTQ+ community. 249 Currently, twentythree states have laws that protect against discrimination in lending on the
grounds of sexual orientation, and twenty states have laws that protect against
gender identity discrimination. 250 Listing and discussing every state-level law is
beyond the scope of this article; instead, it suffices to say that financial institutions
will have to consider another layer of regulations beyond the focus of this article.
Financial institutions that are subject to state laws will potentially have
experience on how to adjust for complying at the federal level or will already be
complying if there is not a difference between the state and federal requirements.
Federal regulators may look to the state requirements that mirror the new federal
requirements and mirror a state as a best practice or use a state’s requirements as
a springboard for creating the federal requirements. Additionally, financial
institutions that are not subject to requirements at a state level could look at the
various laws and compliance requirements at the state level to aid their efforts in
planning the necessary actions to adapt to a federal level requirement.
IV. WAYS THAT MORE CONCRETE PROTECTION CAN BE CREATED
A. Why More Concrete Protection is Needed
Without a change to the law that expressly prohibits discrimination against
the LGBTQ+ community, the treatment of the community will continue to depend
on the political administration and the interpretations of the political appointees
246. See generally CFPB Abusiveness Framework Announcement, supra note 245; CARNELL
supra note 85, at 551-52 (providing background on UDAP and UDAAP).
247. See supra notes 237-240 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 235-240 and accompanying text.
249. See First Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869) (finding national banks subject
to state laws unless state law prevents discharging federal duties); Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8,
at 22 (listing states prohibiting discrimination in lending based on sexual orientation and gender
identity).
250. Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8, at 23 (listing states prohibiting lending discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity); LGBTQ+ HOUSING REPORT, supra note 69, at 23
(totaling states without protection).
ET AL.,
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in charge of the relevant federal agency. 251 LGTBQ+ protections are not just
vulnerable in the area of financial services. 252 For example, HUD proposed a rule
change under the Trump administration that attempted to undo previous
protections created under the Obama administration for transgender
individuals. 253 The Obama-era rule required homeless shelters to provide services
to transgender individuals based on the gender that the individual identified as
and prohibited shelters from refusing services just because the individual was
transgender. 254 However, just one day after Trump-appointed HUD Secretary
Carson testified to Congress that he did not anticipate a change to the rule, HUD
proposed a new rule that would roll back the Obama-era protections. 255 Trump
Attorney General Sessions also dismantled former Obama Attorney General
Holder’s guidance memo to the DOJ that stated sex discrimination included
transgender status. 256 The community’s rights to healthcare, adoption, and
education have also varied by presidential administration. 257
While statutes can only be repealed by Congress or found unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, administrative agencies can generally change their own rules
if they follow the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the new rules
typically receive deference unless the agency’s actions are demonstrably arbitrary
and capricious. 258 Some federal district courts have found that Trump
administration rules that allowed discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community
violated the APA, but there has not been a ruling from a Court of Appeals or
251. Hearing on Financial Services and the LGBTQ+ Community: A Review of Discrimination
in Lending and Housing Before the H. Comm on Fin. Serv., 116th Cong. 7 (2019) [hereinafter David]
(statement of Alphonso David, President, Human Rights Campaign) (stating need for Equality Act to
amend Fair Housing Act of 1968 to add “sexual orientation and gender identity to list of protected
characteristics”); Tobin, supra note 47, at 10-15; see CFPB SAGE Letter, supra note 13; Hilary J.
Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 861, 863-64 (2015)
[hereinafter Allen Business as Usual] (stating criminal law and private litigation are not effective to
address financial industry’s negative behavior); Mishkin, supra note 113.
252. See generally Tobin, supra note 47, at 14 (discussing HUD’s Equal Access rule changes
impacting housing); Holder Memo, supra note 13; Sessions Memo, supra note 13.
253. See sources cited supra note 252.
254. See sources cited supra note 252.
255. Tobin, supra note 47, at 14.
256. See Holder Memo, supra note 13; Sessions Memo, supra note 13.
257. Katie Keith, Third Court Rules Against Provider Conscience Rule, HEALTH AFFS. (Nov. 20,
2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191120.14018/full/; see, e.g.,Andrew
Kreighbaum, Transgender Protections Withdrawn, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb, 23 2017, 3:00AM),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/02/23/trump-administration-reverses-title-ix-guidancetransgender-protections; Julie Moreau, Trump Admin’s Adoption Waiver ‘Intentional Harms’ Gays,
Report Says, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2020, 4:30AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/trumpadmin-s-adoption-waiver-intentionally-harms-gays-report-says-n1237631; Trudy Ring, Trump Admin’s
‘License to Discriminate’ Health Care Rule Struck Down, THE ADVOCATE (Nov. 06, 2019), https://
www.advocate.com/health/2019/11/06/trump-admins-license-discriminate-health-care-rule-struck-down.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a); Chevron, U.S.A. Inc, v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (stating when a court reviews a challenge to federal agency’s interpretation of a statute
within the agency’s oversight, the court must see if statute is ambiguous on the issue and if so, any
reasonable interpretation from the agency will stand); see infra Part IV Section b.
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Supreme Court ruling on the issue. Informal guidance, including informal
interpretive rules, is even easier to change, as was illustrated by the changes made
under the Trump administration to the DOJ’s guidance memos on the meaning of
“based on sex,” and also by the CFPB’s short-lived “abusiveness” framework
which was abandoned by the Biden administration. 259
More concrete and explicit protections barring discrimination against the
LGBTQ+ community in the provision of financial services can be created by
promulgating new formal rules and regulations, passing the Equality Act, by
enacting separate legislation specific to fair lending like Representative Al
Green’s (D-TX) Fair Lending Act for All, by ratifying the Equality Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, or by attempting a state-level solution. 260 This Part will
consider these approaches as possible improvements to the status quo that can
succeed individually, or combined in a complementary manner.
B. Administrative Law
Before CFPB issued the ECOA interpretive rule, it was legal for a financial
institution to deny an applicant’s credit application or charge higher rates because
the applicant(s) were LGBTQ+, as indicated by the three studies discussed in the
HMDA section. 261 The new interpretive rule is a welcome policy change, but
implementing an informal interpretive rule provides the lowest level of protection
in administrative law because interpretive rules are easily rescinded. 262 A new
administration merely has to state that it is reading the applicable statute
differently to justify rescinding an interpretive rule. 263 Thus, to create a more
concrete level of protection via administrative law, a rule must be promulgated

259. Id.; Keith, supra note 257; Ring, supra note 257; see supra notes 245-248 and
accompanying text.
260. See sources cited supra note 249; see David, supra note 251; see Laura Eckert, Inclusion
of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 103 COM. L.J. 311, 334
(1998).
261. See Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8, at 3, 9 (2019) (stating most federal laws do not
prohibit discrimination in lending based on sexual orientation); Sun & Gao, supra note 8 (stating no
requirement to disclose sexual orientation); see also Cyrus Mostaghim, The True Colors of Financial
Services and LGBTQ+ Discrimination, AM. U. BUS. L. REV.: THE BLR BUZZ BLOG (Nov. 16, 2019)
[hereinafter Mostaghim LGBTQ+ Discrimination], http://www.aublr.org/2019/11/the-true-colors-offinancial-services-and-lgbtq-discrimination/ (serving as author’s initial exploration on topic,
providing additional background information and risk of discrimination against LGBTQ+ community
in fintech AIs).
262. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing section
553 of the Administrative Procedures Act’s exemptions for interpretive rules and general policy
statements); see generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 37–38 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (discussing difference between interpretive and substantive rules).
263. See ANDREW F. POPPER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
282–83, (3d. ed. 2016) (illustrating the distinction between interpretive rules and substantive rules via
discussion of Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F. 2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1947), Nat’l Org.
of Veterans’ Advocates v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and views of
various legal scholars).
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through one of the processes that give administrative rules the force of the law,
such as formal rulemaking, notice and comment, or negotiated rulemaking. 264
To rescind a rule that has the force of the law, an agency must “publish a
‘concise and general’ statement of basis and purpose.” 265 The reasoning asserted
for the agency’s decision must also have a rational connection to the facts cited
as support for the agency’s justification. 266 Should the reasons asserted fail to pass
judicial review, the reviewing court will deem the action to be arbitrary and
capricious and reverse the agency’s action. 267
While the recission of formal rules is possible (albeit more difficult than
rescinding an interpretive rule), rulemaking allows an agency to address an issue
within the agency’s jurisdiction and avoid the partisan gridlock in Congress. 268
To be clear, the creation of a more concrete level of protection for the LGBTQ+
community via formal rulemaking cannot be achieved through any one single
rule. While ECOA makes discrimination against protected classes in access to
credit illegal, the law is just one of the financial regulation statutes that cover
consumer finance, and the law does not provide all the necessary tools for
regulators to identify discrimination. 269 Protection without the ability to identify
issues via supervision and examination of banks leaves the CFPB, other
regulatory agencies, and consumer advocate groups only able to act on an
individual consumer’s complaint. 270 In short, multiple statutes will require
multiple formal rulemakings to implement protections for the LGBTQ+
community. 271
Despite the preference for formal rulemakings, more informal regulatory
approaches do have some positive aspects. The first aspect is that an agency can
issue a clarification on an interpretive rule via a policy statement that gives

264. See id.; id. at 72-174, 610-27 (discussing various forms of rulemaking and their
requirements, if force of the law applies for a rule issued under each process, and providing additional
guidance and requirements via excepts of applicable case law); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing section 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act’s
exemptions for interpretive rules and general policy statements); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing difference between interpretive and
substantive rules).
265. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(defining the requirements and standard for judicial review of an agency’s action of rescinding a rule);
POPPER ET AL., supra note 263, at 149 (discussing how State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, (1983), and section
553(c) of the APA creates a requirement for rescinding rules).
266. See sources cited supra note 265.
267. See sources cited supra note 265.
268. See supra notes 265-267 and accompanying text; POPPER ET AL., supra note 263, at 505
(discussing scope of administrative agency power).
269. See id.; see generally Kennedy et al., supra note 109 (providing overview of the CFPB’s
mission and an overview of the laws that CFPB has jurisdiction to enforce).
270. See 2012 Equal Access Rule, supra note 182, at 5663, 5669–70 (addressing public
comments on the lack of data to identify discrimination against the LBTQ+ community in housing
and urging HUD to create a database to help identify discrimination against the community).
271. Id.
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guidance on what is permissible under the rule. 272 As long as the guidance is
within the scope of the promulgating agency’s expertise, the guidance will receive
some deference from the courts. 273 Second, an informal interpretive rule does not
preclude an administrative agency from pursuing additional formal
rulemaking. 274 As Judge Wald stated in the opinion for American Hospital
Association v. Bowen, 275 “The function of the second § 553 exemption, for
“general policy statements,” is to allow agencies to announce their “tentative
intentions for the future.” 276 Thus, an administrative agency can use an informal
interpretive rule to serve as notice to the public and financial institutions about
the agency’s intentions for future actions, including promulgating more formal
rules. 277 A more formal rule promulgated based on an informal interpretive rule
will remain in force even if the informal interpretive rule is rescinded at some
point in the future. 278 However, no amount of rules (formal or informal) can force
the political leadership of an agency to actively enforce regulations.
Enforcement may become less likely as a result of CFPB’s final rule on
supervisory guidance that was issued in February of 2021. 279 Essentially, the rule
states that CFPB will not pursue enforcement actions based on violations of
supervisory guidance and that CFPB examiners generally may not “criticize
(including through the issuance of matters requiring attention, matters requiring
immediate attention, matters requiring board attention, documents of resolution,
and supervisory recommendations) a supervised financial institution for, and
agencies will not issue an enforcement action on the basis of, a “violation” of or
“non-compliance” with supervisory guidance.” 280 The discussion in the final
rule’s documentation highlights the similarities and differences between

272. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that judicial review for the
interpretation of a regulation should give deference to the regulation’s promulgator “unless ‘plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’”); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2424 (2019)
(holding Auer deference does not apply when the regulation or interpretation is out of the scope of the
agency’s expertise); POPPER ET AL., supra note 263, at 203-05 (explaining and clarifying Auer
deference).
273. Id.
274. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing section
553 of the Administrative Procedures Act’s exemptions for interpretive rules and general policy
statement).
275. 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
276. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
277. See id. at 1046.
278. Id.
279. See Role of Supervisory Guidance, 86. Fed. Reg. 9261, 9262, 9265 (Feb. 21, 2021) (stating
CFPB will not pursue enforcement actions based on violations of supervisory guidance and CFPB
examiners may not “criticize (including through the issuance of matters requiring attention, matters
requiring immediate attention, matters requiring board attention, documents of resolution, and
supervisory recommendations) a supervised financial institution for, and agencies will not issue an
enforcement action on the basis of, a “violation” of or “non-compliance” with supervisory
guidance.”).
280. Id.
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supervisory guidance and interpretive rules, and explicitly says that interpretive
rules can be enforced although supervisory guidance cannot. 281
This suggests that enforcement of CFPB’s ECOA interpretive rule (or a future
final rule with the force of the law) will not be directly impacted, but there is the
potential for the rule on supervisory guidance to frustrate enforcement of any
supervisory guidance needed to flesh out the interpretive rule or any other future
rules for the other consumer protection statues that address the LGBTQ+
community. 282 An example would be the scenarios of harassing behavior, hate
speech and threats to out an individual, in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
discussion. 283 It may be possible to frame the use of hate language specific to the
community or threatening to out an individual as a direct violation of the statute
using the traditional “but-for” argument for sex-based discrimination, 284 but it
would be far easier to issue supervisory guidance that states these actions are
examples of LGBTQ+ discrimination. 285
The potential for the rule to frustrate actions under the ECOA interpretive
rule, a future final rule, or new rules for the other consumer protection statutes
that require the creation of supervisory guidance to address concerns unique to
the LGBTQ+ community illustrates the desirability of a more concrete and
permanent legal foundation for preventing discrimination against the community.
C. Classifying the LGBTQ+ Community as a Quasi-Suspect Class
Notwithstanding the agility of formal and informal rulemaking, more durable
protection is desirable, and it could be provided by the courts. If a court were to
apply the Cleburne factors to the LGBTQ+ community, strong arguments could
be made that the LGBTQ+ community is a quasi-suspect class entitled to a

281. Id. at 9265.
282. See id. at 9262; sources cited supra note 18.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 208-210.
284. While sex-based discrimination case-law technically only applies to the associated statute,
such as Title VII for employment, courts and regulators tend to follow case law from other statutes
that is analogous with the type of behavior at issue and regulators tend to mimic case law from other
statutes in regulations that cover the same subject. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
778-79 (1998) (establishing reasonable care standard for employers to avoid liability for indifference
under Title VII (employment)); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 630 (1999) (holding
liability for indifference to sexual harassment is possible under Title IX (education)); Quid Pro Quo
and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices under the
Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63054 (Sept. 14, 2016) (codified at 24 C.F.R. Pt. 100) (defining quid
pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VIII (Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §
3601 et seq.)); Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/policy-guidance-employer-liability-under-title-vii-sexualfavoritism (last visited July 1, 2021) (stating EEOC quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment definition under Title VII).
285. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739-41 (2020) (discussing “but-for” standard
for Title VII).
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heightened level of scrutiny for constitutional challenges and inclusion in antidiscrimination and civil rights statutes. 286
For the first Cleburne factor (relating to the severity and pervasiveness of
discrimination), the LGBTQ+ community has faced discrimination and
persecution since before the founding of this country (when it was illegal to be
gay). 287 After women gained the right to vote, the full LGBTQ+ community had
the right to vote, but the community still faced limitations on its access to political
power. 288 Although there was some activism from the community, the visibility
of the community was limited in many ways. 289 Part of the issue was that most
LGBTQ+ individuals were still closeted due to fear of loss of employment,
particularly during and after the Lavender Scare, a period of time where the
federal government actively sought and purged LGBTQ+ employees from federal
employment. 290 As the LGBTQ+ community gained more visibility via the
media, events like the Stonewall riots and Pride parades, political figures like
Harvey Milk, the creation of advocacy groups like the National Gay & Lesbian
Task Force, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), Lambda Legal, and GLBTQ
Legal Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), and more individuals came out (some
inspired by the many queer anthems 291) and showed their “True Colors” to friends
286. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (finding state constitution amendment barring and undoing
local LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws unconstitutional); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986) (finding no right to sexual privacy for LGBTQ+ community), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003); GSAFE LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48; PBS LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note
48; Fair Educ. LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48; see sources cited supra note 286.
287. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (finding right to marriage for
LGBTQ+ community); see also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774-75 (2013) (finding
Defense of Marriage Act’s restrictions on LGBTQ+ community unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (finding right to sexual privacy for LGBTQ+ community); Romer, 517
U.S. 620, 635-36 (finding unconstitutional state constitution amendment barring and undoing local
antidiscrimination laws against LGBTQ+ individuals); Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (finding no right to
sexual privacy for LGBTQ+ community), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; GSAFE LGBTQ+
Timeline, supra note 48; PBS LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48; Fair Educ. LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra
note 48.
288. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding no right to sexual privacy for LGBTQ+
community), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; GSAFE LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48; PBS
LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48; Fair Educ. LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48; ACLU History:
Earliest Advocacy on Behalf of LGBT People, AM. C. L. UNION (Sept. 1, 2010), https://www.aclu.org
/other/aclu-history-earliest-advocacy-behalf-lgbt-people; About Us, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN.,
https://www.hrc.org/hrc-story/about-us (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
289. See GSAFE LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48; PBS LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48;
Fair Educ. LGBTQ+ Timeline, supra note 48. See generally ERIC CERVINI, THE DEVIANT’S WAR:
THE HOMOSEXUAL VS. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2020) (providing historical information on
the LGBTQ+ community’s efforts to lobby for change in the law related to the community).
290. See sources cited supra note 289.
291. Lyrics to queer anthems are commonly about survival, acceptance, self-love, or unrequited
love. Examples include Somewhere Over the Rainbow, I Will Survive, I’m Coming Out, Beautiful,
Born This Way, and titles used in TripAdvisor’s Cease and Desist letter to organizers of the 2019
Boston Straight Pride Parade attempt. JUDY GARLAND, SOMEWHERE OVER THE RAINBOW (MGM
Records 1956); GLORIA GAYNOR, I WILL SURVIVE (Polydor Records 1978); DIANA ROSS, I’M
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and family (increasing the number of people who “knew someone”) the
community’s ability to effect political change increased.292
For the first part of the third prong, the LGBTQ+ community does have
immutable characteristics for sexual orientation and gender identity. 293 Although
science has not determined what factors determine sexual orientation or gender
identity, people generally agree that it is not an active choice that can be
changed. 294 While some may argue that being transgender is not an immutable
trait because an individual’s sex changes with a transition surgery, the reasoning
is flawed. 295 There is a difference between sex and gender, where sex deals with
the body’s primary and secondary sex characteristics and gender is an immutable
trait 296 of one’s own perception. 297 Moreover, it is inappropriate to use the

COMING OUT (Motown 1980); CHRISTINA AGUILERA, BEAUTIFUL (RCA 2002); LADY GAGA, BORN
THIS WAY (Interscope Records 2011) (serving as an LGBTQ+ anthem stating “I’m beautiful in my
way ‘cause God makes no mistakes, I’m on the right track, baby I was born this way…no matter gay,
straight, or bi, lesbian, transgendered life, I’m on the right track baby, I was born to survive”); Callum
Borchers, Here’s Every Gay Anthem Reference in TripAdvisor’s Letter to the ‘Straight Pride Parade’
Organizers, WBUR NEWS (July 24, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/07/23/boston-straightpride-corporate-sponsor-cease-and-desist (describing why each song title in TripAdvisor’s Cease and
Desist Letter is a gay anthem).
292. CYNDI LAUPER, TRUE COLORS (Epic Records 1986); see sources cited supra note 289;
Molly Ball, How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politics-activism
/397052/ (discussing tactics used to convince general public of the “normalcy” of the gay community
and how “old-lady lesbians… were the best messengers”).
293. See Jeffrey Kluger, No Ben Carson, Homosexuality is Not a Choice, TIME,
https://time.com/3733480/ben-carson-gay-choice-science/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) (discussing
possibilities of homosexuality’s cause and refuting incorrect theories); Answers to your Questions
About Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N [hereinafter
APA Transgender], https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender (last visited Mar. 19, 2020)
(providing background on transgender community and gender identity and expression); Answers to
Your Questions For a Better Understanding of Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality, AM. PSYCH.
ASS’N [hereinafter APA Sexual Orientation], https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/orientation (last visited
Mar. 19, 2020) (illuminating background information on sexual orientation and answering frequently
asked questions).
294. See Kluger, supra note 293; APA Transgender, supra note 293; APA Sexual Orientation,
supra note 293.
295. See KC Clements, What’s the Difference Between Sex and Gender?, HEALTHLINE,
https://www.healthline.com/health/sex-vs-gender#is-there-a-connection? (last visited. Mar. 19, 2020)
(proposing “gender is in the brain and sex is in the pants”) (quotations omitted); Kluger, supra note
293.
296. “The term “immutable trait” is used within the constitutional context to describes a trait
that is beyond the power of the individual to change, trans and gender-nonconforming identities are
immutable in that they exist and cannot be changed, however, the LGBTQ+ community recognizes
that gender is a fluid spectrum that can and does change through a person’s life.” Email from Chris
Marin, Vol. 73 Admin. L. Rev. Note & Comment Ed., to Cyrus Mostaghim, Author (July 24, 2021,
1:18 PM) [hereinafter Marin] (on file with author); see Telephone Interview with Dana Savage,
President Elect- QLaw Ass’n of Wash. and co-drafter of Wash. State SB 5313 (Gender Affirming
Treatment Act) (July 25, 2021) [hereinafter Savage] (providing insight on the transgender community
view regarding immutable traits).
297. See Marin, supra note 296; Savage, supra note 296.
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changes a trans or gender non-conforming person makes to their physical sex
characteristics as a means of arguing against the immutability of their gender
identity. 298 The physical changes to the individual’s sex characteristics do not
create a new identity; they are an act of confirming and making seen the identity
that already exists (because they were “Born This Way”) within their own
experienced sense of self. 299 It must also be noted that “trans or gender nonconforming individuals exist naturally and” it is an inappropriate measure of their
immutability to look to a person’s changes to their physical sex characteristics to
help align with their gender identity as the changes are already confirming an
immutable identity that is already there. 300 Finally, for the second part of the third
prong, the LGBTQ+ community has kept to itself throughout history for safety
reasons. 301 While there has been progress in acceptance since the legalization of
gay marriage, the community continues to face public and private animus from
intolerant groups and still has tendencies to keep to itself. 302
The Bostock decision could be invoked to bolster this Cleburne analysis.
While the Bostock decision was about statutory protections under Title VII, the
Supreme Court’s holding implicitly acknowledges that the LGBQ+ community
experiences discrimination. 303 Thus, a future case could cite Bostock as
persuasive and argue that the community’s need for statutory protection against
discrimination under Title VII reflects a need for more comprehensive protection
via designation as a quasi-suspect class. 304 However, the Court’s history of
providing the LGBTQ+ community new rights in piece-meal fashion suggests
that it will be unlikely to adopt a blanket quasi-suspect class designation for the
community. 305 The change in the Court’s composition after the death of Justice
Ginsburg also makes such an outcome less likely. 306 Additionally, the Court’s
new composition also calls into question whether the application of the arguments
and legal analysis from Bostock to a case that involved a financial regulation
statute, such as ECOA, would conclude that discrimination based on sexual

298. See id.
299. LADY GAGA, supra note 291; see Marin, supra note 296; Savage, supra note 296.
300. See Marin, supra note 296; Savage, supra note 296.
301. See e.g., Perry, N. Halkitis, Discrimination and Homophobia Fuel the HIV Epidemic in
Gay and Bisexual Men, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (April 2012), https://www.apa.org/pi/aids/resources
/exchange/2012/04/discrimination-homophobia.
302. See id.
303. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
304. See generally Devah Pager & Hana Shepard, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANNU. REV. SOCIO. 181
(2008) (discussing discrimination against the African American community in the areas of
“employment, housing, credit markets, and consumer interactions”).
305. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
306. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Passes, Justice Amy Coney Barret Seated as Replacement, ABA
(Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project
_press/2020/year-end-2020/amy-coney-barrett-replaces-ginsburg-on-supreme-court/ (discussing Justice
Barrett’s replacement of Justice Ginsburg and Barrett’s difference in ideology).
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orientation and/or gender identity is a form of sex discrimination. However, if
reached, a favorable court decision would create more durable prohibitions on
financial discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community. 307 Additional
regulatory action (such as changes to HMDA data points) would then be needed
to provide the necessary tools for regulators to identify that discrimination. 308
D. Congressional Action and New Legislation
Currently, two pieces of legislation are under consideration that could create
more concrete statutory protections: the Equality Act and Representative Al
Green’s (D-TX) Fair Lending Act for All. 309 The Equality Act is comprehensive
legislation that amends the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ECOA, and other statutes
and regulations to include sexual orientation and gender identity under sex
discrimination. 310 Representative Green’s Fair Lending Act for All focuses on
amending fair lending statutes and regulations to include sexual orientation and
gender identity. 311 Both would provide important and durable protections for the
LGBTQ+ community, but the likelihood of passage is still in question as the
House of Representatives has passed the Equality Act during multiple sessions
while the Senate has not voted on the act (and currently appears to lack support
to overcome the 50/50 split by party-line vote). 312
E. The Equality Amendment to the Constitution
A constitutional amendment could provide general protection to the
LGBTQ+ community, and while unlikely, it might not be impossible. 313
Virginia’s ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment in 2020 was the last one
needed to achieve the required number of states for the amendment’s

307. See supra notes 269-271 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 269-271 and accompanying text.
309. The Equality Act, H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019) (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Fair Lending Act for All, H.R. 166, 116th Cong. (2019).
310. See H.R. 5, 116th Cong., §§ 6-10 (2019).
311. See H.R. 166, 166th Cong., §§ 3-6 (2019).
312. Tyler Deaton, How to Pass the Equality Act in a Tied Senate, THE HILL (Feb. 26,2021),
https://thehill.com/changing-america/opinion/540692-how-to-pass-the-equality-act-in-a-tied-senate
(discussing challenges of passing the Equality Act in the Senate’s 50/50 split by political party); Sarah
McBride, Historic: U.S. House of Representatives Passes the Equality Act, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN
(May 17, 2019), https://www.hrc.org/news/historic-house-of-representatives-passes-the-equality-act
(documenting prior passage of Equality Act in the House).
313. See Joseph Guzman, Virginia Finalizes its passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, THE HILL
(Jan. 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/equality/480172-virginia-ratifies-equalrights-amendment (discussing Virginia being final state ratifying Amendment and resulting legal and
constitutional questions on passage timeline); Tom Spiggle, Did Virginia Just Make The Equal Rights
Amendment part of the Constitution?, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle
/2020/02/07/did-virginia-just-make-the-equal-rights-amendment-part-of-the-constitution/#21611023393c
(providing Equal Rights Amendment background and legal issues from approval timeline).
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ratification. 314 However, since the ratification occurred after the 1979 deadline,
the status of the amendment is unclear (the issue is further complicated by the
fact that some states that ratified the amendment want to withdraw their
ratification). 315
Should the Equal Rights Amendment become effective, it could be helpful to
the LGBTQ+ community, but the amendment would have the same issue as Title
VII; the text does not explicitly mention sexual orientation and gender identity. 316
Unlike Title VII, there is not an “EEOC” for constitutional amendments that can
provide clarification and guidance; interpretation lies with the Supreme Court. 317
Thus, even if the other constitutional and legal issues with the Equal Rights
Amendment were resolved, the Court would have to decide a case under the Equal
Rights Amendment that adopts the logic in Bostock before sexual orientation and
gender identity were constitutionally protected by the word “sex.” 318
F. State-Level Action
Although federal protection would be the most comprehensive, it seems
unlikely that this will be achieved in the near term. States sometimes step into the
breach when there is federal inaction. However, while states may adopt more
restrictive requirements for financial institutions operating within their borders,
they run the risk of preemption by federal law. 319 Additionally, unless all states
pass similar legislation, the LGBTQ+ community will have a mere patchwork of
protection. The experience of states allowing same-sex marriage is instructive
here. 320 Before the Obergefell case established federal same-sex marriage, only
nineteen states allowed same-sex marriage. 321 Thus, it seems unlikely that state
legislatures will provide a comprehensive solution. 322 Even if state legislation is
enacted (just as if a federal law is enacted by Congress or a formal rule is adopted
by a regulatory agency), it will only provide durable protection to the LGBTQ+
community if it can survive the associated judicial review process. 323
314. See Guzman, supra note 313.
315. Id.; see Spiggle, supra note 313.
316. See H.R.J. Res. 75, 68th Cong. (1923).
317. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (establishing and defining SCOTUS’s judicial power,
stating other courts are inferior, and binding all courts to follow SCOTUS precedent); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 146 (1803) (stating Supreme Court is final court and superior to all other courts).
318. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
319. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; First Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869)
(finding national banks subject to state laws unless state law prevents bank from discharging federal
duties).
320. See generally A Brief History of Civil Rights in the United States: A Timeline of the Legalization
of Same-Sex Marriage in the U.S., GEO. LAW LIBR., (Aug. 26, 2021, 8:08AM) [hereinafter Gay Marriage
Timeline], https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4182201.
321. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (establishing LGBTQ+ community’s
marriage rights); see Gay Marriage Timeline, supra note 320.
322. See generally Gay Marriage Timeline, supra note 320.
323. See sources cited supra note 113.
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V. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF REGULATORY CHANGES
No attempt to create protection for the LGBTQ+ community from
discrimination in access to financial services is guaranteed to be permanent.
However, a complementary mix of more durable protections can significantly
improve the situation for the community. If more concrete protections for the
LGBTQ+ community are adopted, the CFPB may need to make new rules and
offer guidance to address new scenarios specific to discrimination against
LGBTQ+ individuals. 324 In doing so, the CFPB must be mindful of overlapping
statutes. Naturally, anytime that new statutory or regulatory requirements are
created, a regulated entity will incur some costs associated with adopting the new
requirements.
A. Costs of Complying with New Regulatory Changes
The impact of the CFPB’s informal rule interpreting ECOA as covering
sexual orientation and gender identity may result in new requirements for data
collection, compliance procedures, financial institutions’ Standard Operating
Procedures for approving credit applications, any associated documentation
requirements, and regulatory procedures for examination of financial
institutions. 325 Financial institutions may experience an increase in operational
costs as a result, and failure to properly implement new requirements may result
in compliance penalties, enforcement actions, or other legal liability. 326
Compliance costs will also increase with any future updates to any of the financial
regulation statutes or regulations. Financial institutions could also lose business
from the LGBTQ+ community if discriminatory practices come to light as a result
of the new protections for the community. 327 However, as our society continues
to grapple with issues of diversity, equity, and inclusion across all aspects of life,
a marginal increase in operating costs to ensure fairness and equity in access to
credit is easily justified. 328

324. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 342 (discussing powers of federal regulatory
agencies).
325. See Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 173, 185, 190–91 (2013) [hereinafter Allen FS Philosophy] (discussing cost impact of financial
regulation and how cost-benefit analysis is sometimes used to determine value of regulation); John C.
Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE
L.J. 882, 998-99 (2015) [hereinafter CBA & Fin. Reg.] (asserting cost-benefit-analysis of financial
regulation cannot be done accurately and not a good basis for policy setting).
326. See id.
327. See Karma Allen, supra note 78; John Schneider & David Auten, The $1 Trillion
Marketing Executives are Ignoring, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/debtfreeguys/2018/08/14/the-1-trillion-marketing-executives-are-ignoring; Umoh, supra note 77;
Nick Wolny, The LGBTQ+ Community has $3.7 Trillion in Purchasing Power; Here’s How We Want
You to Sell to Us, ENTREPRENEUR (June 10, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/334983.
328. See id.; Jordan Bryan, How 2020 Accelerated Conversations on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion,
GARTNER: SMARTER WITH GARTNER (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/how-
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B. Increased Complexity in Supervision, Enforcement, and Compliance
Financial regulators already face a large amount of difficulty and complexity
in the supervision and examination function of financial institutions. The addition
of sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected statuses raises
specific issues where victims are members of multiple protected classes. A victim
may need to identify which protected class was the reason for the discrimination,
and regulators may need to update their internal guidance and procedures to
address scenarios that involve overlapping protected statuses. A regulator’s job
will also be more complex if an issue implicates multiple statutes or regulations
or falls under the jurisdiction of multiple regulators at the federal, state, or local
level.
In addition to reviewing customer complaints, regulators can discover
discrimination through two different methods. 329 The first is during a regulator’s
examination activities. 330 The second method is through an existing field test
method using undercover shoppers sent by a regulator or advocate group. 331
Currently, regulatory agencies and consumer advocate groups use undercover
shoppers as an in-person test to identify potential discrimination. 332 By sending
in various combinations of couples (i.e., both white, both the same minority, any
combination of white and minority, or two different minorities), an institution or
advocacy group can gather real-time data to identify and prove discrimination on
the basis of race. 333
Regulators and consumer groups could expand their undercover shopper
programs to test for sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination by
sending in shoppers posing as various members of the LGBTQ+ community.
However, the presence of multiple protected statuses in one test case would result
in more difficulty with the identification of which status or statuses were the
reason for discrimination. It is far easier to identify race discrimination within
heterosexual pairings. For the LGBTQ+ community, additional steps may need
to be taken to determine if the discrimination against a same-sex couple was
because it was a male couple, female couple, same race couple of both gender
pairings, or a mixed-race couple of both gender pairings. The same steps would
also need to happen for a transgender paring, including one or both individuals
being transgender. This need exponentially increases the number of tests that
would be needed and the level of effort and complexity for identifying the reasons
for the discrimination. Given the sensitivity of information about sexual
orientation and gender identity, the CFPB must be particularly mindful of data
2020-accelerated-conversations-on-diversity-equity-and-inclusion/ (discussing how the events of 2020 have
forced greater dialogue on diversity and equity issues than the #MeToo movement in the employment arena).
329. See CARNELL, supra note 85, at 344-45 (discussing purpose of federal regulator examining
financial institutions); see Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8, at 30-32 (describing field tests).
330. See sources cited supra note 329.
331. See id.
332. See Dillbary & Edwards, supra note 8, at 30-32 (describing field tests).
333. See id.
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privacy-related statutes so that it can have the data that it needs while protecting
the privacy of consumers.
C. Implications Related to Data Privacy Statutes
The CFPB must identify a best practice for anonymizing sexual orientation
and gender identity data while maintaining a way to identify individuals as
necessary for enforcement actions (and if a law provides a private right of action,
allowing the individual to locate their data). 334 Anonymizing data is vital because
sexual orientation and gender identity data points are sensitive subjects for
individuals and collecting them could result in individuals being outed
involuntarily. Also, because IT security breaches are becoming more common,
CFPB must consider extra steps and requirements to protect its internal data to
avoid accidental “outings.”
Individuals who may be comfortable self-identifying when seeking financial
services may not be entirely out in their personal or professional life. For
example, consider a scenario where CFPB pursues enforcement action against a
financial institution and lists consumers who self-identified but are not
completely “out” in various trial documents. Unless a party designates a court
document as a confidential record, court documents are open to the public. 335
Thus, individuals listed in court documents could be outed to friends, family
members, and employers or coworkers who read those documents or media
reports based on them. 336 Thanks to Bostock, these outed individuals will have
employment protection under Title VII. 337 However, there are no legal remedies
for outing an individual to their friends and family, particularly if the outing
results in a financial loss, such as disinheritance by family members. 338
CFPB may be able to look at HUD’s experience with the 2012 promulgation
of the Equal Access Rule for guidance on how to handle this issue. 339 When HUD
proposed the rule, there were public comments lobbying for a database to house
data to help identify individual instances or trends of discrimination and to
monitor the rule’s effectiveness in preventing discrimination. 340 Additionally,
334. See Stephen P. Mulligan & Chris D. Linebaugh, Cong. Rsch. Serv., Data Protection Law:
An Overview 8-10, 12-14, 21-23, 25-36, 38-40 (2019) [hereinafter Data Protection Law] (providing
an overview of data protection statutes and potential requirements for data financial institutions store
or transmit).
335. Court Records and Proceedings: What is Public and Why?, CONNOR REPORTING,
https://connorreporting.com/court-records-proceedings-public/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2021).
336. See id.; Mathieu J. Shapiro, When Is a conflict Really a Conflict? Outing and the Law, 36
B.C. L. REV. 587, 588 (1995) (stating First Amendment protections often preclude a claim against the
media for a breach of privacy).
337. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
338. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. L. REV. 159, 200 (2015) (asserting
that courts have “routinely invoke[d] qualified immunity to defeat informational privacy claims”
against the government); Shapiro, supra note 336; CONNOR REPORTING, supra note 335.
339. See source cited supra note 270.
340. See id.
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there were also comments about the LGBTQ+ community’s unique privacy
concerns regarding sexual orientation and gender identity. 341 HUD ultimately
declined to create a database to track cases related to the LGBTQ+ community
citing concerns about the sensitive nature of data on sexual orientation and gender
identity. 342 HUD said that it would take time to study the best way to capture data
to address the concerns from the commentary. 343 However, no such database or
tracking data currently exists. 344 The CFPB may nevertheless be able to work
with HUD to capitalize on HUD’s experience, analysis, or feedback related to
sexual orientation and gender identity data points. 345
Implementation of new mandatory data points under HMDA or Section 1071
could necessitate new rules and regulations on documentation or data storage
requirements due to the sensitive nature of information about sexual orientation
and gender identity. 346 There is a chance that the data requirements may overlap
with various data protection requirements across many different laws such as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). 347 This article will
focus on the GLBA.
The GLBA is implemented via Regulation P and governs how financial
institutions handle a consumer’s nonpublic personal information. 348 Institutions
cannot disclose this information to nonaffiliated parties without the consumer’s
consent and must provide notice of their privacy policies and practices on a
routine basis. 349 Organizations must provide an initial notice when the customer
relationship is established and an annual notice thereafter for as long as the
relationship lasts. 350 The notice must explain what data the institutions collect
about the consumer, where the data is shared, how the information will be used,

341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or
Gender Identity, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,763, 64776 (Sept. 21, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Equal Access Rule]
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5) (continuing to decline creating a database to track LGBTQ+ datapoints).
345. See 2016 Equal Access Rule, supra note 344; 2012 Equal Access Rule, supra note 182, at
5663, 5669–70 (addressing public comments on the lack of data to identify discrimination against the
LBTQ+ community in housing and urging HUD to create a database to help identify discrimination
against the community).
346. See id.
347. See Data Protection Law, supra note 334.
348. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801; 12 C.F.R. pt. 1016.
349. Id. at §§ 6802-03.
350. See CHRIS BRUMMER, FINTECH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 486-88 (2020) (providing background
information on the GLBA); CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to Upstart Network, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU: NEWSROOM (Sept. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Upstart NAL Announcement], https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-announces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-network/
(announcing relationship with Upstart, a tech company entering the financial industry that was not subject
to regulation by other FIRREA).
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and how it will be protected. 351 However, this barrier is often a mere formality as
institutions can claim consent via consumer inaction in response to the required
annual notice as many, if not most, consumers ignore physical mail sent to them.
A digital solution is likely to be just as ineffective as consumers are equally
unlikely to read a message with the title of “Annual Privacy Disclosure Notice”
in their personal email or the institution’s internal web messaging portal.
If sexual orientation and gender identity become collected data points,
guidance may be needed on how to comply with GLBA with respect to those data
points to avoid accidental outings. 352 Members of the community will be at
various points of being “out” throughout their lives, from closeted, partially out
to either friends and family or at work (but not necessarily inclusive of all three),
and fully out. Barring making data points on sexual orientation and gender
identity categorically nonpublic personal information, difficult determinations
may need to be made about the point at which being “out” is considered public
information. Finally, it would be irresponsible not to mention the dangers of an
undetected hack and the ripple effects. 353 Regulators and institutions will need to
consider the appropriate procedures and safeguards to protect AI systems
(discussed in Part VI) and the underlying data in addition to any new data breach
notification procedures that may be necessary, particularly with the issue of
outing consumers. 354
VI. MOVING TO THE FUTURE: FAIR LENDING AND FINTECH’S
USE OF MACHINE LEARNING AIS
Since the current legal framework leaves the LGBTQ+ community in a gray
area, the community may not always have an established remedy for
discrimination in financial services. 355 Without concrete remedies to address this
discrimination, the status quo of the current regime will continue, and
discrimination could increase as the use of AI with machine learning algorithms
in the financial industry expands. 356

351. See BRUMMER, supra note 350; see also Upstart NAL Announcement, supra note 350.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 334-345.
353. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014) [hereinafter AI Due Process] (discussing
impact of AI decisions on all monetary aspects of society); Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in
AI Development, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1932-33 (2019) [hereinafter AI Data Duties] (stating the
danger from a hacking of the data or AI coding and asserting that insuring integrity of the data and AI
code is necessary for preventing the resulting ripple effects of compromised data or AI coding);
FINREGLAB, MARKET AND POLICY CHALLENGES ARE SLOWING USE OF CASH-FLOW DATA IN U.S.
CREDIT UNDERWRITING 1 (2020), https://finreglab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FinRegLab
_Press-Release_02-26-2020_Cash-Flow-Data-Policy-Report.pdf (describing data risks and security
concerns in fintech).
354. See AI Due Process, supra note 353, at 18 (stating need for procedural safeguards in AI).
355. See Holder Memo, supra note 13; Sessions Memo, supra note 13.
356. See Allen Business as Usual supra note 251; Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 157, 169 (2020) [hereinafter Allen Driverless Finance] (discussing business efficiencies
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A. Machine Learning AI’s Role in Fintech and the Potential Liabilities
The term AI encompasses any computer-based system that can mimic human
behavior by taking the associated inputs and performing the tasks that normally
require human intelligence to create the associated output. 357 From a pop-culture
standpoint, one of the most popular representations that people associate with the
concept of AI is Skynet from the Terminator movie franchise. 358 However, that
association is far from the truth as today’s AIs are not independently intelligent
thinking machines. 359 Many successful AI systems are not fully autonomous but
rather involve hybrids of computer and human decision-making (human-in-theloop system). 360
There are two main categories of AI based on how they operate. The first
category is where the field of AI began and involves knowledge representation
and logic rules, in which explicit facts and rules about some activity are
programmed into software, harnessing the knowledge of domain experts about
how some system or activity operates. 361 In short, a human can follow the AI’s
actions through the “decision-making process” and know the exact reasons for
the AI’s output. In the financial sector, financial institutions use this type of AI to
create efficiencies, such as screening and rating applications for financial
services. 362
The second category, which is the type of AI that this article is concerned
about, involves the system analyzing data for patterns previously encountered and
makes predictions, better known as “machine learning.” 363 Machine learning has

of AI algorithms); ROBERT BARTLETT ET AL., CONSUMER-LENDING DISCRIMINATION IN THE
FINTECH ERA 4 (2019), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/papers/discrim.pdf
(claiming fintech AIs discriminate against minorities); Chris DeBrusk, The Risk of Machine-Learning
Bias (and How to Prevent It”, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REVIEW (Mar. 26, 2018), https://
sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-risk-of-machine-learning-bias-and-how-to-prevent-it/ (stating risk of
building bias in AI algorithms).
357. Artificial Intelligence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
artificial%20intelligence (Sept. 29, 2021).
358. THE TERMINATOR (Paramount Pictures 1984).
359. Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305,
1308-09 (2019).
360. Id. at 1320.
361. Id. at 1319 and 1327.
362. Allen Driverless Finance, supra note 356; Allen Business as Usual supra note 251, at 86364 (2015) (stating criminal law and private litigation not effective to address financial industry’s
negative behavior); Anya Prince & Daniel Schwartz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1267, 1273–74, 1283 (2019) [hereinafter AI Proxy
Discrimination] (defining proxy discrimination as when discrimination against a protected class
happens based on factors that are not protected statuses, and providing AI’s history, evolution, general
business impact, and risks).
363. See AI Proxy Discrimination, supra note 362 at 1317; Dr. Iria Giuffrida, Liability for AI
Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 439, 445 (2019) (describing two types of AI systems, the first
being one where humans based their decision on the system’s output and the other being an “out of
the loop” system because the system is fully autonomous and there is no human connection to the
decision); Princeton University Center for Information Technology Policy, CITP Launch Initiative on
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two general subgroups based on the level of human involvement in creating the
algorithm and validating its output. 364 For the first subgroup, humans have a high
level of involvement with the algorithm’s creation and also validate the AI’s
output for quality control. 365 An example is having humans select only the images
with faces and then comparing the data from the humans to the output of the AI.
Simple machine learning falls within this first subgroup because it utilizes known
algorithms to create the output, and, like the first category, a human with subject
matter expertise would be able to know how the algorithm arrived at the output.
A simple machine learning AI for facial detection would comprise multiple
algorithms (e.g., detection of edges, small features, and large features) that are
combined to run in a specific order to create the final output to determine if there
is a face in the picture.
The second subgroup is called “deep learning” which relies on neural nets,
sometimes referred to as a “black box algorithm” because a human is not always
able to have full insight into how the AI created its output. 366 Here, the neural net
learns by being fed a control set of data (using the previous facial detection
example, the control set would be pictures of faces that the engineer selected),
and the algorithm would generate parameters for detecting faces in other pictures
based on the connections made through the control data. 367 As a result, the neural
net AI process is encompassed within one singular facial detection algorithm. 368
While the engineer’s involvement with selecting the control data technically
involves a human, the engineer’s actions are not incorporated into the neural
network. Thus, even with human involvement, it is almost impossible to
understand how a neural net AI works as the AI’s process is not transparent or
easy to audit, cannot be monitored, and creates an opportunity for discrimination
or unwanted manipulation to happen. 369
In the beginning, the financial industry’s neural net AIs learned from datasets
of human decisions to develop the AIs’ decision-making rules. 370 Now, these AIs
can find new and better correlations between the traditional data points for a
AI and Policy: Ed Felten, YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://youtu.be/JRDnL6Yssbg (providing
background on AI); CGP Grey, How Machines Learn, YOUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2017) https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9OHn5ZF4Uo (illustrating how AIs are built and tested).
364. See sources cited supra note 363.
365. See sources cited supra note 363.
366. See sources cited supra note 363; Email from Susanna Mostaghim, Cloud Solutions
Architect - Advanced Analytics and AI at Microsoft Azure, to Cyrus Mostaghim, Author (June, 18,
2021, 3:38 PM ET) (on file with author) [hereinafter S. Mostaghim email].
367. S. Mostaghim email, supra note 366 (discussing deep learning and engineer’s actions).
368. See S. Mostaghim email, supra note 366 (discussing deep learning and engineer’s actions).
369. Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy:
The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1239 (2017) (expressing
concerns about AI and its impact on society); CGP Grey, supra note 363 (illustrating how AIs are
built and tested). See Allen Business as Usual supra note 251; Allen Driverless Finance, supra note
356; AI Proxy Discrimination, supra note 362.
370. See Allen Driverless Finance, supra note 356 at 161-62; BARTLETT ET AL., supra note
356 at 7; DeBrusk, supra note 356.
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decision. 371 Similar to how Facebook creates a user insight page, these algorithms
are starting to use data from external sources like online transactions, internet
history, and social network activity to develop predictions with the same
transparency concerns. 372 The impact of AI on the financial industry is not limited
to deposit-taking banks and mortgages. 373 Financial institutions that are not banks
can use AI to decide what credit cards to offer, the individuals that qualify for the
credit card, and the interest rate, transaction fees for financial services like trading
stocks, and interest on loans issued by banks or non-banks like Quicken Rocket
Mortgage.
Financial institutions should be concerned about potential future liability
related to AI decisions because if an institution’s algorithm violates any of the
fair lending statutes, the institution may be held legally responsible and required
to pay damages and penalties. The institution could be held responsible because,
ultimately, the decision becomes the institution’s when it adopts the AI’s
output. 374 The level of liability would also hinge on whether the institution
automatically adopted the AI system’s decision or if a human reviewed the output
and decided that it was acceptable. 375 While there is uncertainty about liability in
this context, institutions should monitor and adjust as case law and regulations
develop. 376 Financial institutions will face more risk of responsibility for liability
than just the violation of a financial statute. A financial institution could also be
liable for damages associated with an individual consumer’s common-law tort
claim, a class-action claim, or even a product liability tort claim. 377 Additionally,
these liabilities could increase if the AI’s decisions appear to discriminate against
a protected status. 378

371. See STUDENT BORROWER PROTECTION CTR., EDUCATIONAL REDLINING, 15-19 (Feb. 2020),
https://protectborrowers.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Education-Redlining-Report.pdf; Allen Driverless
Finance, supra note 356; Balkin, supra note 369; AI Proxy Discrimination, supra note 362.
372. See AI Proxy Discrimination, supra note 362.
373. See AI Data Duties, supra note 353, at 1925 (discussing development and advancement of
AI algorithms).
374. See Giuffrida, supra note 363; Lyle Morgan, AI Certification Initiatives Could Prove Very Useful
to Legal Industry, Experts Say, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/aicertification-initiatives-could-prove-very-useful-to-legal-industry-experts-say (discussing the various parties
that have some amount of responsibility for the liability when “AI systems produce problematic results”).
375. See sources cited supra note 374.
376. See Giuffrida, supra note 363, at 445-47 (examining an institution’s liability risk for AI
decisions).
377. See id.; AI Data Duties, supra note 353, at 1925-26 (discussing development and
advancement of AI algorithms); Cyrus Mostaghim, “The Danger of Proxy Discrimination in FinTech
and the Need for Regulatory Sandboxes”, AM. U. BUS. L. REV.: THE BLR BUZZ BLOG (Apr. 1, 2020)
[hereinafter Mostaghim Proxy Discrimination], http://www.aublr.org/2020/04/the-danger-of-proxydiscrimination-in-fintech-and-the-need-for-regulatory-sandboxes/ (asserting the danger of AI proxy
discrimination).
378. Mostaghim Proxy Discrimination, supra note 377.
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B. The Risk of AI Discrimination
Using datasets of human decisions to create AIs is problematic because the
AI is only as good as the data used to teach the algorithm. 379 Thus, there is a
chance that datasets may include examples of discriminatory lending against the
LGBTQ+ community that gets built into the fintech models, resulting in new
discriminatory lending actions; the need to fix things now is even more critical. 380
Even worse, the data could cause discrimination or be used to hide discrimination
against the LGBTQ+ community or any other protected class in a way that would
be harder to detect since a regulator cannot audit the algorithm’s programming. 381
Attention must also be directed at the individuals programming the algorithms to
ensure the engineer’s unconscious or active biases do not affect the programming
or any step of the process (data collection, data cleaning, data transformation,
variable/feature selection, model building, and review). 382 Finally, another
concern related to discrimination in AI is that AIs may make inappropriate
decisions based on correlations in the data, i.e. when Facebook’s AI moderator
removed legitimate posts about the Coronavirus. 383
Decisions that indirectly impact a protected status in a negative manner
(because the decision was not based on a protected status, but was based on
factors that were a proxy for the status) are a type of discrimination known as
proxy discrimination. 384 Already, there are allegations of AI-driven proxy
discrimination against minorities in financial services. 385 One allegation came
from the Student Borrower Protection Center in a report about a fintech company,
Upstart, claiming that the AI engaged in discrimination through the use of nontraditional lending data. 386
Big tech companies with massive amounts of consumer data (like Facebook
and Google) are exploring the provision of financial services. 387 That data
includes all kinds of consumer information that the financial industry does not

379. See DeBrusk, supra note 356.
380. Balkin, supra note 371.
381. See Balkin, supra note 371; AI Due Process, supra note 353, at 10 (stating inability to
audit AI algorithms); AI Data Duties, supra note 353, at 1918 (postulating danger of using AI to
deflect liability); Mostaghim LGBTQ+ Discrimination, supra note 261.
382. See AI Due Process, supra note 353, at 13-14 (postulating risk of engineer’s unconscious
bias impacting AI code and datasets).
383. Paresh Dave, Social Media Giants Warn of AI Moderation Errors as Coronavirus Empties
Offices, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-googleidUSKBN2133BM.
384. AI Proxy Discrimination, supra note 362, at 1268, 1285 (identifying proxy
discrimination).
385. See Mostaghim Proxy Discrimination, supra note 377.
386. See Upstart Report, supra note 235.
387. See Ryan Brown, Big Tech Will Push Deeper into Finance This Year—But Avoid the
‘Headache’ of Being a Bank, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/03/big-tech-willpush-into-finance-in-2020-while-avoiding-bank-regulation.html (discussing Facebook, Google, and
Apple entering the finance industry).
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currently utilize in making financial decisions: the use of these new kinds of data
would magnify the risk of direct or proxy discrimination. 388 The use of such
varied and detailed forms of data also magnifies concerns about the difficulties in
comprehending an AI’s decisions and identification of what was the contributing
factor(s) for a discriminatory action. 389 However, the concern is not necessarily
unique to big tech because as long as financial institutions comply with the
applicable data privacy laws, institutions may be able to purchase these new kinds
of data about their customers. 390
The data used in fintech’s AIs blend to create another issue related to data
privacy and outing: this type of AI data mining may allow an institution to learn
or infer sexual orientation or gender identity outside of a self-identification, which
could result in proxy-discrimination. 391 Similar to how the community uses
“gaydar” to identify other members while out in public, data about an individual’s
preferences, likes, frequently patronized businesses, and other similar
information could allow an AI to infer sexual orientation or gender identity. 392 In
other words, the techniques for the in-person observation of social cues, actions,
and other visual and sound data to make an in-person assessment can also be
applied to the digital world. 393 Researchers are already trying to create AIs that
can determine a person’s sexual orientation. 394 Digital data of interest might
include the target individual’s common Facebook friends, their liked Facebook
pages, the hashtags they used for Instagram posts, and even the accounts the
individual follows on Instagram. The various online quizzes online that claim to
be able to guess an individual’s sexual orientation are examples of simple “gaydar

388. Dan Murphy, Big Tech’s Invasion of Banking, MILKEN INST. REV. (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/big-techs-invasion-of-banking (asserting big tech can access
better data than banks); see Brown, supra note 387; see supra notes 348-352 and accompanying text.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 383-385; Balkin, supra note 371; AI Due Process,
supra note 353, at 10 (stating inability to audit AI coding); AI Data Duties, supra note 353, at 1918
(postulating danger of using AI to deflect liability); Mostaghim LGBTQ+ Discrimination, supra note
261.
390. See Tom Groenfeldt, PNC Launches a Fintech Startup Inside the Bank, FORBES (Aug. 29,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2019/08/29/pnc-launches-a-fintech-startup-insidethe-bank/ (highlighting PNC’s creation of a fintech subsidiary that does not use any data PNC collects,
only anonymized data that is purchased); see supra Part V Section c.
391. See AI Proxy Discrimination, supra note 362, at 1274-75, 1291 (providing AI’s history
and evolution, general business impact, risks, and applicability to financial services); Mostaghim
LGBTQ+ Discrimination, supra note 381.
392. See Justin Lehmiller, The Science of “Gaydar”: How Well Can We Detect Other People’s
Sexual Orientation?, IND. UNIV. KINSEY INST., https://kinseyinstitute.org/news-events/news/201712-18-gaydar.php (explaining gaydar) (last visited July 1, 2021); see supra notes 381-83.
393. See id.; Elija Marc Cassidy, The Convergence of Niche and Mainstream Social Networking
Services in Gay Men’s Digital Culture: How Generation Y Uses Facebook to Extend and Enhance
the Gaydar Experience (2014), https://spir.aoir.org/ojs/index.php/spir/article/view/9027/7122
(discussing how gay men use social media to confirm another individual’s sexual orientation).
394. James Vincent, The Invention of AI ‘Gaydar’ Could be the Start of Something Much
Worse, VOX (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/21/16332760/ai-sexuality-gaydarphoto-physiognomy.
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AIs.” 395 Imagine the correlations, correct and incorrect, that fintech’s AIs could
make with the massive amount of consumer data in their databases, particularly
if big tech becomes part of the financial industry.
If discrimination is not properly addressed now, it will be built into all
computer-based decision-making. 396 The cost to correct the discriminatory
algorithms will increase exponentially down the road versus getting it right while
we are still in the infancy of fintech. 397 This cost may not be limited to corrective
action as there is always a risk of legal liability for past actions, particularly if the
FTC’s guidance on AI discrimination and UDAP remains, if CFPB issues similar
guidance for UDAAP, or if both agencies issue more formal regulations related
to the matter. 398
VII. CONCLUSION
Without action at the federal level that creates more concrete protections for
the LGBTQ+ community, the community will remain vulnerable to
discrimination in access to financial services. This article has demonstrated that
multiple paths can be taken to create more concrete protections, either
individually or in a complementary manner. In particular, the CFPB should
seriously consider the collection of data points on sexual orientation and gender
identity for HMDA and the section 1071 rulemaking for small-business data. This
data collection must be done in a way that balances the policy concerns unique to
the LGBTQ+ community, though. A requirement to collect sexual orientation and
gender identity data will likely cause some uneasiness for individuals who are not
out of the closet, and so this data must be handled securely and sensitively.
However, the collection of these data points will enable regulators and the public
to be able to identify lender actions that indicate a potential discriminatory impact
on the LGBTQ+ community.
More concrete protections should be pursued quickly to prevent
discrimination from being incorporated in fintech’s AI algorithms. The fintech
sector is already using previous credit decisions to train fintech’s AI algorithms,
and those decisions may be discriminatory against the LGBTQ+ community. This
discrimination is hard to remove from an algorithm after the fact.
Because fintech’s AI systems are growing more advanced and sophisticated
each day and becoming more embedded in the foundation of our financial system,
the cost of correction will increase exponentially the longer it takes to start
remediation. This cost will not fall just on the financial institutions but will be
passed on to consumers. Thus, almost every consumer will feel the impact in
some form. The timely creation of more concrete protections for the LGBTQ+

395.
2021).
396.
397.
398.

GOOGLE, https://google.com (search for “quizzes to guess if gay”) (last visited May 2,
See AI Due Process, supra note 353, at 18 (stating need for procedural safeguards in AI).
See id.
See supra notes 235-36, 248 and accompanying text.
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community will mitigate the cost of the associated ripple effects on financial
institutions that ultimately will be passed on to consumers.

